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ABSTRACT 
 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY AND CREDIT RATINGS’ ABILITY TO PREDICT 
DEFAULT 
Michael V. Chin 
Catherine Schrand 
This study examines whether the quality of borrowers’ accounting information 
determines the accuracy and timeliness of credit ratings issued by rating agencies. I 
consider two possible effects. The news effect implies higher quality accounting provides 
better information to credit rating agencies, enabling them to develop better ratings. The 
discipline effect describes how the disclosure of financial information, particularly that 
which recognizes bad news in a timely manner, can limit rating agencies’ ability to issue 
inflated ratings to appease their clients. I further explore whether these effects vary with 
the characteristics of private information, which can influence both the incremental news 
provided by accounting information and the agencies’ inclination to issue inflated ratings. 
I utilize rating data from two major agencies: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), an issuer-paid 
agency that obtains private information and may have incentives to cater to issuers; and 
Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), an investor-paid agency that relies solely on public 
information to develop its ratings. The differences between these agencies make EJR an 
effective control group for the identification of the accounting quality effects. I measure 
the quality of credit ratings by their ability to predict default and measure changes in 
default risk in a timely and accurate manner. I find that debt issuers with earnings that 
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exhibit more timely loss recognition and asymmetric timely loss recognition have credit 
ratings that predict default more accurately and are downgraded more promptly. I also 
find that issuers with upward-managed earnings have less timely rating downgrades. 
These effects are comparable for both rating agencies for a broad set of firms, but they 
are more pronounced for EJR ratings relative to S&P ratings for firms near default, when 
agency reputation costs and information value are high. Conflicts of interest and private 
information do not predictably modify the effects of accounting quality on credit rating 
quality. The results support the existence of the news effect of accounting quality but 
provide limited evidence of the discipline effect or the moderating impact of private 
information. 
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1. Introduction 
 In this study, I examine how the timeliness and accuracy of credit ratings are 
influenced by the information available to the credit rating agencies. Rating agencies are 
sophisticated information intermediaries whose business is the reduction of information 
asymmetry between debt issuers and market participants. Investors and the general public 
expect ratings to provide a reliable and timely measure of a debt issuer’s “ability and 
willingness to meet its financial obligations,” but empirical and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that the quality of ratings varies significantly.1 For example, it was widely 
acknowledged that the largest agencies failed to predict significant credit events, such as 
the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, the Enron and Worldcom bankruptcies, and the global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s. As a result, Congress passed new regulation in the form 
of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
(Langohr et al., 2008). These laws generally sought to improve credit rating quality 
through increased competition and transparency. These events have also motivated a line 
of academic research investigating the underlying causes of variation in the quality of 
credit ratings (e.g. Beaver et al., 2006; Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009; Becker and Milbourn, 
2011; Strobl and Xia, 2012; Bruno et al., 2013). The regulators, media, and researchers 
have focused primarily on agency conflicts of interest or regulatory frictions as drivers of 
biased or sluggish ratings. However, to my knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
whether rating quality is a function of the quality of public information available to rating 
agencies. 
                                                          
1 “Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs,” Standard & Poor’s, Inc., 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us, 2015. 
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Although rating agencies use many sources of information to generate their 
ratings, I focus on borrowers’ financial accounting information, which is a particularly 
important source. Rating agencies incorporate information from the financial statements 
into default prediction models that are critical to the development of ratings.  Standard 
and Poor’s states that, “a company's financial reports are the starting point for the 
financial analysis of a rated entity.”2  The academic literature has also shown that credit 
rating agencies utilize and adjust accounting information (Kraft, 2012; Altamuro et al., 
2012) and that accounting information can be used to predict bond ratings (Kaplan and 
Urwitz, 1979; Ziebart and Reiter, 1992; Ball et al., 2008). If accounting provides 
incremental information to rating agencies, then higher quality accounting gives rating 
agencies better information, enabling them to develop more timely and accurate ratings. I 
refer to this process as the news effect of accounting quality. Section 2 of the paper 
focuses on identifying this effect. 
I examine two additional effects of accounting quality: the discipline effect and 
private information overlap. These describe the relationship of rating agencies’ conflicts 
of interest and private information, respectively, with issuer accounting information. 
Prior analytical and empirical studies suggest rating agencies that are paid by debt issuers 
may issue inflated ratings and delay rating downgrades in order to satisfy their clients 
(Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Manso, 2013; Bruno et al., 2013). If this is the case, the 
public disclosure of high quality financial accounting reports may compel the rating 
agency to update their ratings with this information to avoid damage to their reputation. 
                                                          
2 Standard & Poor’s, Inc. “2008 Corporate Criteria: Analytical Methodology.” April 15, 2008. 
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Overlap implies that private information and public accounting information act as 
substitutes. If a rating agency has accurate private information, it may depend less on 
accounting information to produce high quality ratings. I also examine whether the 
discipline effect and private information overlap interact to increase the impact of 
accounting information on credit ratings. These effects are explored primarily in section 3 
of the paper. 
A key feature of this study is the use of ratings from two nationally-recognized 
rating agencies – Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR). 
S&P is paid for its ratings by the debt issuers, while EJR is paid by outside investors. 
This difference in the compensation structure of these agencies enables me to explore 
unique hypotheses and identify the effects described above. Because of their economic 
relationship with issuers, S&P receives private information directly from management. In 
contrast, EJR relies solely on public information to develop its ratings. The other major 
consequence of S&P’s fee arrangement is that it may be faced with conflicts of interest 
that hinder the issuance of accurate ratings, while EJR should be free of such conflicts. 
Because of these differences, EJR serves as a control group throughout my analysis. By 
using a sample of firms that are rated by both agencies, I mitigate concerns about 
correlated omitted variables due to unobservable differences between firms. In addition, I 
utilize the ratings data from the two agencies to provide novel evidence regarding the 
overall performance of investor-paid versus issuer-paid rating agencies that is not 
conditioned on the quality of accounting information. 
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I measure the quality of credit ratings based on their ability to predict default and 
measure changes in default risk in a timely and accurate manner. Default prediction is the 
key purpose of credit ratings and is the basis on which rating agencies assess their own 
performance. Prior research comparing Big Three3 agency ratings to EJR ratings 
evaluates their relative performance based primarily on three criteria: the lead/lag 
relationship of the agencies’ rating changes; stock and bond market responses to rating 
changes; and the correlation of ratings with initial bond yields (e.g. Beaver et al., 2006; 
Bruno et al., 2013). I use default prediction accuracy as a better, more direct measure of 
rating quality that should be less influenced by market liquidity, market efficiency, or 
investor behavior. I employ a variety of tests that are designed to assess the ability of 
credit ratings to accurately predict default and measure changes in default risk in a timely 
manner.  
In my analyses to identify the news effect, I define accounting quality using three 
measures. The first two are timely loss recognition (TLR) and asymmetric timely loss 
recognition (ATLR), i.e. conservatism (Basu, 1997). Earnings are considered to be timely 
if they quickly recognize changes in firm value. Timely loss recognition (ATLR) is 
particularly useful for debt holders (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003) whose concave 
payoff function places a premium on negative information. Accordingly, these attributes 
should also be important measures of the usefulness of earnings for credit rating agencies, 
which serve as information intermediaries for firms’ current and potential creditors. My 
third measure of accounting quality is discretionary accruals, a proxy for earnings 
                                                          
3 Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch 
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management. Recent studies by Beaver et al. (2012) and Alissa et al. (2013) suggest that 
earnings management obscures information used by in default prediction models and may 
lead to credit rating changes. I extend their analyses to examine whether ratings issued 
based on managed issuer earnings are less accurate and timely in predicting default. In 
my analysis to identify the discipline effect of accounting and its overlap with private 
information, I exploit accounting restatement announcements as public information 
events and signals of poor previous accounting quality. This provides a powerful setting 
to identify the distinct effects of accounting quality. 
Based on my analysis, I find that more timely accounting contributes to more 
accurate and timely credit ratings for both EJR and S&P, while upward managed earnings 
reduces rating quality, consistent with the news effect of accounting quality. The effect of 
accounting quality on the timeliness of rating downgrades is generally more significant 
than its impact on the accuracy of the rating level in predicting default. This is not 
surprising, as my proxies for accounting quality relate specifically to earnings, which 
itself is a measure of changes in (as opposed to the level of) financial position. I also find, 
somewhat surprisingly, that the news effect is similar for S&P and EJR in most settings. 
This implies that S&P is generally not fully exploiting its information advantage, but is 
instead relying on financial statement information. 
I find that both rating agencies tend to issue rating downgrades following adverse 
accounting restatements, though EJR is more likely to downgrade than S&P. This 
demonstrates that the agencies do not see through accounting deficiencies or errors and 
provides further evidence of the news effect. However, I find little evidence to support 
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the discipline effect or the private information overlap of accounting information. Using a 
variety of measures, I find that the effect of accounting quality does not vary with the 
level of conflicts of interest or the quality of private information as predicted. While the 
results of my analyses do not support the effects of conflicts of interest or private 
information, this may be due to the challenge of identifying clean measures of these 
constructs. In order to validate the measures, I examine the direct impact of conflicts of 
interest and private information quality on rating quality without regard to accounting 
information. Although several of the proxies for conflicts of interest and private 
information quality have found theoretical and empirical support in prior studies (e.g. 
Bolton et al., 2012; Strobl and Xia, 2012; Kedia et al., 2014), my validation tests yield 
mixed results. In several cases, the effects are similar for both S&P and EJR ratings, 
despite EJR’s presumed lack of both conflicts of interest and access to private 
information. These findings suggest the measures may be too noisy to identify the 
discipline effect or private information overlap of accounting information. As a result, I 
analyze firms that are very close to default as an alternative approach to identify the 
discipline effect. In this setting, information about credit risk is very important to 
outsiders and the potential costs to S&P’s reputation for failing to predict default 
outweigh its catering incentives. The relationship between earnings quality and rating 
timeliness is more pronounced for EJR ratings than for S&P ratings in this situation. This 
suggests that S&P incorporates more private information and/or expends greater 
monitoring effort for these high risk firms, and is, therefore, less affected by accounting 
quality when there are fewer conflicts of interest. EJR has a smaller information set and 
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fewer resources, so it is not able to comparably increase its monitoring intensity for these 
issuers. This finding is consistent with the discipline effect of accounting quality. 
In ancillary analysis, I provide unconditional evidence (i.e. without incorporating 
accounting quality effects) that EJR ratings generally outperform S&P ratings in 
capturing default risk. This finding adds to the literature that compares these two 
agencies, which has not thoroughly examined their differential performance in predicting 
default (Johnson, 2004; Beaver et al., 2006; Strobl and Xia, 2012; Akins, 2013; Bruno et 
al., 2013; Milidonis, 2013; Berwart et al., 2013). This result also provides a baseline 
measure of the relative performance of S&P and EJR that helps to assess my primary 
research agenda: testing the effects of accounting quality on credit ratings. 
This study primarily contributes to the literature on the quality of credit ratings. 
While prior studies focus on conflicts of interest, I examine whether higher quality 
accounting information provided by the debt issuer contributes to more accurate and 
timely ratings. Although the primary function of credit rating agencies is to reduce 
information asymmetry between debt issuers and investors, the agencies themselves are 
subject to the quality of information provided by the issuers. I also find some limited 
evidence that more timely earnings can mitigate the negative impact of conflicts of 
interest on rating quality. The paper also has implications for prior studies that often 
assume credit ratings are a superior measure of credit risk and that rating agencies can 
distinguish between high and low quality information and adjust their ratings accordingly 
(e.g. Ball et al., 2008; Jorion et al., 2009). I relax this assumption and find that rating 
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agencies do not perfectly discern accounting quality, nor do they utilize alternative 
sources of information to sufficiently offset lower quality accounting. 
This study also contributes to the literature on issuer-pay and investor-pay rating 
agencies. This line of research has focused primarily on the agency problems facing S&P 
and has examined the relative timeliness of rating changes and capital market reactions to 
those changes (Strobl et al., 2012; Bruno et al., 2013; Berwart et al., 2013). My study 
examines how accounting quality affects the properties of S&P and EJR’s ratings and 
shows that, in some settings, S&P’s information advantage reduces the impact of 
borrowers’ accounting quality on its ratings. In addition, I provide evidence on ratings’ 
ability to predict default and measure default risk, which are two key objectives of ratings 
that have not been fully examined in prior studies within this area of research.  
 Finally, I contribute to the literature on earnings quality in debt markets. Easton et 
al. (2009) show that earnings are an important source of information for debt market 
participants. Beaver et al. (2012) demonstrate that poor earnings quality reduces the 
power of default prediction models that include accounting measures. Other papers have 
shown that the quality of earnings impacts the design of debt contracts (Ball et al., 2008; 
Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008). I add to this stream of literature by showing that 
borrowers’ earnings timeliness and discretionary accruals alter the efficacy of 
information intermediaries in the debt market. 
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2. The news effect of accounting quality on credit ratings’ default 
prediction 
2.1 Prior literature and hypothesis development 
2.1.1 Issuer-paid rating agencies’ reliance on accounting information 
 There are several reasons that accounting can provide incremental information, or 
news, to S&P or other large, issuer-paid credit rating agencies. Accounting data is an 
easily-accessible source of information, and rating agencies confirm that it is an 
important input to the rating process. If the financial statements do a relatively poor job 
of providing relevant information, rating agencies should place more weight on other 
information, such as public disclosures, market-based information, or private 
information. If these alternative sources of information are adequate substitutes for 
accounting information, then the quality of accounting will not have a significant impact 
on the rating agencies’ output. However, if other information is an inadequate substitute, 
the agencies’ ratings will be affected by the quality of the issuers’ financial reporting.  
 Accounting quality could also modify rating quality if agencies fail to recognize 
and adjust for the information in accounting. Despite rating agencies’ expertise, it is 
plausible that they could inappropriately rely on low quality accounting information. 
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) finds that banks, which also have significant 
private information, do not fully distinguish financial reporting quality. It is reasonable to 
expect that credit rating agencies may have similar difficulty in doing so. Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests the limited ability of the agencies to accurately interpret 
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accounting information or to utilize alternative sources of information to overcome 
accounting deficiencies.4 
 Another reason there may be a news effect of accounting information is that 
issuer-paid rating agencies may shirk on their monitoring responsibility because it is 
costly to gather information. Prior analytical and empirical studies suggest that rating 
agencies may choose to exert relatively low levels of monitoring effort for a number of 
reasons. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) find that credit rating quality improves following the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and attribute this to the increased 
regulatory pressure to improve monitoring and produce better ratings. Doherty et al. 
(2012) develop an analytical model that shows issuers will continue to pay a 
monopolistic rating agency for relatively imprecise and inaccurate ratings in order to 
avoid being pooled with the set of very risky firms that choose not to obtain ratings. In 
their model, rating agencies’ market power allows them to extract rents while expending 
little effort to improve the accuracy of their ratings. In another analytical paper, Opp et al. 
(2013) show that the regulatory usage of ratings provides a revenue stream that is not 
dependent on the accuracy of ratings, allowing the rating agencies to shirk on monitoring 
effort. If rating agencies are expending suboptimal monitoring effort, as these studies 
suggest, there will be a news effect of accounting quality because the agencies rely on 
this readily-available information rather than obtaining private information. 
                                                          
4 For example, in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom frauds, Moody’s established an Accounting 
Specialist Group to “incorporate accounting, financial reporting and internal control practices more 
systematically into the credit rating process.” Further, S&P acknowledges that accounting changes provide 
new information that can lead to rating changes. In the 1990s, S&P lowered a number of companies’ 
ratings following new accounting guidance related to postretirement medical benefit liabilities because it 
previously had insufficient information to value the obligations. 
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Reliance on accounting as a source of new information implies that accounting 
quality will affect credit ratings’ performance. I specifically analyze timely loss 
recognition, asymmetric timely loss recognition, and discretionary accruals as measures 
of earnings quality that may impact credit rating timeliness and accuracy in measuring 
default risk. In the context of this study, credit rating accuracy describes the ability of the 
credit rating to capture the level of default risk and to distinguish a firm’s risk relative to 
other firms. Rating timeliness corresponds to the responsiveness of credit rating changes 
to changes in default risk. 
Earnings that recognize losses in a timely manner contain information that is 
particularly relevant to the firm’s credit risk. Due to their concave payoff function, 
creditors have a disproportionate interest in negative news relative to positive. Prior 
studies, such as Watts (2003) and Ahmed et al. (2002), argue that earnings exhibiting 
TLR and ATLR may be optimal for debt holders. If rating agencies rely on accounting 
information to develop their ratings, then both the timeliness and accuracy of their ratings 
should be greater when earnings exhibit more TLR. ATLR implies that negative news is 
reflected in earnings more quickly than positive news. This may contribute to faster 
downgrades when issuers experience an increase in default risk. However, prior studies 
(e.g. Givoly and Hayn, 2000) show that ATLR induces a downward bias in earnings that 
may accumulate on the balance sheet over time. If rating agencies cannot unravel this 
bias, it may contribute to some erroneous downgrades that result in lower credit rating 
accuracy. It may also delay the recording of upgrades if good news is concealed by the 
earnings bias. As a result, I predict the following: 
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H1a: Issuers with more timely loss recognition (TLR) in earnings will experience 
more timely rating downgrades conditional on an increase in default risk, and will 
have ratings that more accurately measure the level of default risk. 
H1b: Issuers with more asymmetric timely loss recognition (ATLR) in earnings 
will experience more (less) timely rating downgrades (upgrades) conditional on 
an increase (decrease) in default risk. They will also have biased overall ratings 
that less accurately measure the level of default risk. 
Beaver et al. (2012) find that managed earnings reduce the accuracy of 
accounting-based default prediction models, which suggests that accounting will be a less 
useful source of information for rating agencies. Two recent studies by Alissa et al. 
(2013) suggest that firms manage earnings using discretionary accruals to achieve a target 
credit rating and to reverse rating downgrades. The implication is that rating agencies do 
not recognize that earnings are over- or understated and improperly issue rating upgrades 
or downgrades. If this is the case, then managed earnings can impede timely rating 
changes and result in biased levels of earnings. I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1c: Issuers with more positive discretionary accruals will experience less (more) 
timely rating downgrades (upgrades) conditional on an increase (decrease) in 
default risk. Firms with greater positive or negative discretionary accruals will 
have biased overall ratings that less accurately measure the level of default risk. 
2.1.2 Differential effect of accounting quality for EJR and S&P ratings 
When evaluating the quality of S&P ratings relative to EJR ratings, the key 
question is whether greater information or agency problems will dominate.  S&P should, 
in theory, have a distinct information and resource advantage over EJR. S&P is one of the 
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two largest ratings agencies in the world. It is paid by debt issuers who want ratings on 
their bonds and other debt securities. By virtue of this relationship with issuers, it has 
direct contact with management and is provided with information that is not publicly 
disseminated, such as forecasts and business plans.5 In addition to conducting periodic 
reviews and inquiries, S&P analysts expect management of the issuing firm to contact 
them prior to events or actions that may impact their creditworthiness. S&P also employs 
significant resources in developing ratings, with nearly 1,700 credit analysts and 
supervisors who are dedicated to specific industries and firms. In contrast, EJR is a 
relative newcomer, operating since 1995 and becoming one of the ten SEC-designated 
nationally-recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) in 2007. It is also the 
only NRSRO that is paid by investors rather than issuers.6 Unlike S&P, EJR relies solely 
on public information to determine its rating, and it places particular emphasis on 
financial statements.7 Perhaps most remarkable, EJR employs only five credit analysts 
who combine judgment with proprietary models to develop its credit ratings. Because of 
the difference in information and resources, I predict: 
                                                          
5 Credit rating agencies were originally exempted from full disclosure requirements of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD) when it was implemented in 2000. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the SEC 
removed this exemption in 2010. However, it is not clear that this SEC action has significantly impacted 
private disclosure to rating agencies. A representative from one of the Big Three credit rating agencies 
informed me that they continue to receive non-public information and that they do so legally, regardless of 
the explicit exemption from Reg FD. Various reports published by law firms note that the rating agencies 
often enter into confidentiality agreements, and they are no longer registered as investment advisers, 
effectively removing the agencies from the set of institutions subject to the disclosure restrictions. 
6 Cohan, William. “SEC Sues the One Rating Firm Not on Wall Street’s Take.” Bloomberg.com, 30 
September 2012. 
7 EJR notes in their NRSRO registration form with the SEC that if they receive any non-public information, 
they will wait until the information is made public before incorporating it into their ratings. A senior 
analyst at EJR also informed me that the financial statements and accompanying reports are generally the 
single most important source of information. 
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H1d: The relationship between accounting quality and credit rating quality 
predicted in hypotheses H1a-H1c will be stronger for EJR ratings than for S&P 
ratings. 
2.1.3 Overall performance of Egan-Jones and Standard and Poor’s ratings 
In spite of the ostensible advantages of S&P, extant research suggests that EJR 
ratings are timelier than those issued by S&P and Moody’s (Johnson, 2004; Beaver et al., 
2006; Strobl and Xia, 2012; Bruno et al., 2013; Milidonis, 2013; Berwart et al., 2013). 
This finding is generally attributed to S&P’s conflicts of interest that arise because S&P 
is paid by issuers who have a preference for ratings that are both high and stable (Cantor 
and Mann, 2007).8 Further, as an NRSRO, S&P’s ratings are used by numerous federal 
and state regulations (Covitz and Harrison, 2003), perhaps most importantly for 
determining whether a security is considered to be “investment grade” or “speculative.” 
They are also widely used in the investment policies of large investors, such as pensions, 
and in debt contract covenants and performance pricing provisions (Asquith et al., 2005; 
Ball et al., 2008). These additional uses of S&P ratings can increase the real effects of 
rating changes, which may further compel S&P to maintain rating stability at the expense 
of timeliness.9  
                                                          
8 Bonsall (2013) contributes a conflicting finding that both S&P and Moody’s ratings became more 
informative after they switched to the issuer-pay model in the 1970s. This result is not entirely surprising, 
given changes in firms’ information environments and the use of credit ratings since that time. 
9 Although EJR became an NRSRO in 2007, the use of its ratings for regulatory and contracting purposes 
appears to be insignificant relative to S&P. In addition, a representative of EJR noted that they have not 
made changes to their ratings process or policies since becoming a NRSRO. Consistent with this assertion, 
Bruno et al. (2013) finds that the properties of EJR ratings did not change significantly following their 
NRSRO designation. 
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The primary analyses in my study examine whether accounting quality affects 
credit ratings’ ability to predict default and measure default risk using ratings from S&P 
and EJR. I supplement these findings and provide a baseline measure of S&P and EJR 
ratings performance by examining their relative ability to measure default risk without 
consideration of accounting quality. This additional analysis provides new evidence that 
contributes to the literature on investor-paid and issuer-paid rating agencies. Prior studies 
that include both of these agencies generally do not compare the ratings of the two using 
direct measures of default risk. One exception is Strobl and Xia (2012), which provides 
some descriptive evidence that the difference between EJR and S&P ratings is a 
significant predictor of default rates over a five year horizon. The absence of default 
prediction findings represents a gap in the literature studying these agencies’ ratings. 
In addition, existing studies generally use measures of rating timeliness or 
accuracy, but not both. To measure timeliness, these studies often utilize Granger 
causality tests to examine the lead-lag relationship of both agencies’ ratings (Beaver et 
al., 2006; Berwart et al., 2013; Bruno et al., 2013; Milidonis, 2013). The Granger tests 
show that EJR rating changes tend to lead S&P changes, but this finding by itself does 
not imply that EJR ratings more accurately reflect default risk. For example, EJR may 
record extraneous changes or changes that are too large in magnitude. To measure 
accuracy, some studies use the correlation between ratings and initial bond spreads, 
which does not provide any information about the relative timeliness of rating changes by 
the two agencies. In contrast, I provide evidence on the timeliness and accuracy of S&P 
and EJR ratings before considering how variation in borrowers’ accounting quality 
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affects the performance of these ratings. Prior studies’ findings lead me to expect that 
EJR ratings will be more timely and accurate than S&P ratings due to the impact of S&P 
conflicts of interest, though S&P’s information advantage could lead to the opposite 
result. 
2.1.4 Prior literature on credit ratings and accounting information 
Extant literature has examined credit ratings and accounting information on a 
number of dimensions. As Hilscher et al. (2013) note, the “conventional” view has been 
that credit ratings are generally a superior proxy for the likelihood of default. This 
assumption is maintained in a number of papers, such as Molina (2005), which uses 
ratings as an ex ante default risk measure in examining firms’ optimal use of leverage. 
Ball et al. (2008) develop a measure of earnings quality based on its ability to predict 
rating changes, assuming ratings are the most informative measure of default risk. 
Another extensive stream of research does not assume credit ratings are a superior 
measure, but instead compares the ability of market data, accounting information, and 
credit ratings to predict default or explain bond yields and CDS spreads.10 Other related 
studies examine whether credit ratings can be explained or predicted using accounting 
and market variables (Horrigan, 1966; West, 1970; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Ziebart and 
Reiter, 1992; Galil, 2003; Hovakimian, 2009). Holthausen et al. (1986) and Hand et al. 
(1992) provide early evidence that rating changes provide additional information to 
capital markets despite being partially predictable.  
                                                          
10 See, for example, Ederington et al. (1987), Shumway (2001), Campbell et al. (2003), Kealhofer (2003), 
Loffler (2004), Hillegeist et al. (2004), Hull et al. (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), Duffie et al. (2007), 
Bharath et al. (2008), Das et al. (2009), Hilscher et al. (2013) 
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 More recent studies show that rating agencies adjust reported accounting numbers 
to make them better reflect credit risk information. Altamuro et al. (2012) shows that 
rating agencies adjust their ratings to take into account off-balance sheet operating lease 
liabilities. Kraft (2012) demonstrates that rating agencies make quantitative adjustments 
to financial statement information, as well as qualitative “soft” adjustments, and that 
these adjustments contain information about default risk. 
 Several recent studies consider the effect of information quality on credit ratings 
under the assumption that credit rating agencies observe and adjust for the information 
quality. Jorion et al. (2009) find that firms with investment grade debt increased their 
earnings management activity over time, and that rating agencies reduced their reliance 
on accounting information over the same period. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 
(2006) find that firms with more stringent corporate governance, including higher 
accruals quality and earnings timeliness, have higher credit ratings. Their study views 
earnings as a disciplining device that contributes to a firm’s governance. If earnings are 
informative and timely, then managers have less ability to take value-decreasing actions 
that would increase default risk. Odders-White and Ready (2005) find that higher 
information asymmetry among equity investors is associated with lower credit ratings. 
This finding is consistent with the intuition of Duffie and Lando (2001). When 
information asymmetry is high, credit rating agencies have greater uncertainty. As a 
result, the rating agencies increase their estimate of default risk and lower their ratings 
accordingly.  
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 Finally, there are a few studies that hypothesize that rating agencies may be 
susceptible to poor accounting quality. As described above, there are two papers by 
Alissa et al. (2013) that find that borrowers can induce rating changes by managing 
earnings. In addition, Akins (2013) posits that poor accounting quality increases 
uncertainty in the credit markets and shows that low accounting quality is associated with 
greater divergence in the ratings issued by various agencies. My study differs from these 
by examining whether borrowers’ accounting quality impacts how well credit ratings 
predict default and measure default risk. 
2.2 Sample and descriptive statistics 
My empirical tests use different samples based on the data requirements for each 
test. I construct my primary sample by matching Compustat to CRSP. CRSP data is 
required for the earnings timeliness measures, as well as for estimating the Campbell et 
al. (2008) model. I then match the sample to Mergent FISD, which contains data on debt 
defaults, using the six-digit CUSIP. Based on default data coverage, I limit the sample 
years to 1990-2012, which results in a base sample of 128,742 firm-quarter observations. 
This sample is used to estimate the modified Campbell failure score. 
I add information on S&P ratings from S&P RatingsXpress. When I combine this 
data with the base sample, there are 106,628 observations for which there are active S&P 
long-term issuer ratings. However, I further limit the sample to include only years 1999 
and later, because this is the period for which I have EJR ratings data. For this period, 
there are 71,659 observations for 2,270 firms rated by S&P. I obtained issuer-level EJR 
ratings data directly from Egan-Jones Ratings Company. For most tests, I require firms to 
be rated by both EJR and S&P, which reduces the sample to 37,522 observations for 
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1,332 firms. Of these 1,332 firms, 148 experience a default at some point during my 
sample period. Finally, for tests that incorporate both ratings and the modified Campbell 
model, my sample is reduced to 29,649 firm-quarters for 1,058 firms, of which 106 have 
a default. 
Table 1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the primary sample. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The distributions of variables for this sample are 
very similar to those for the base sample (untabulated). The distributions of EJR and S&P 
ratings are similar, with nearly identical means. The mean of ejrmsp, which is the 
difference between the EJR rating and the S&P rating for each firm-quarter, is 0.01 and 
the median is zero. EJR and S&P have identical ratings approximately 30% of the time, 
and are within one rating notch of each other in 70% of the firm-quarters. In addition, and 
consistent with prior studies, EJR records both upgrades and downgrades more frequently 
than does S&P, as shown by the mean of ejrdown and spdown, which are indicators equal 
to one if the firm’s credit rating is downgraded in the current quarter by EJR and S&P, 
respectively, and equal to zero otherwise. Panel B presents the distributions of EJR and 
S&P ratings, which are generally consistent with the data used in prior studies (Beaver et 
al., 2006; Bruno et al., 2013). I assign numeric values to each letter rating, from 1 for 
AAA to 21 for C. Panel E presents descriptive statistics for the sample of firms that 
default, with one observation for each default (with the exception of the statistics for 
dahead, which has one observation for each downgrade in the year prior to default). Note 
that there are fewer defaults in this table because the sample is limited to those defaults 
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with sufficient data available for testing as of one year prior to default. Note that leverage 
is much higher and ratings for these firms are much lower than for the main sample. 
2.3 Empirical analysis and results 
2.3.1 Baseline results for overall accuracy of EJR versus S&P 
 I estimate a default prediction model to assess both the unconditional accuracy of 
EJR and S&P ratings, as well as the incremental information each provides relative to the 
other. I follow Campbell et al. (2008) and Hilscher et al. (2013) and estimate twelve 
separate logistic regressions that estimate the probability of default over each of the 
subsequent twelve quarters. Estimating separate models for each horizon allows the 
coefficients on the independent variables to vary with the prediction horizon and provides 
a more comprehensive assessment of their predictive power relative to focusing on only a 
single period. I model the conditional probability of default as: 
 Pr𝑡(Def𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 1|𝐗𝒊,𝒕) = (1 + exp(−𝐗𝒊,𝒕𝜷𝒌))
−1
 (1) 
where Def𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 is an indicator that equals one if firm 𝑖 defaults in month 𝑡 + 𝑘. Note that 
the dependent variable relates to default in quarter t+k, not the cumulative default 
between time t and time t+k. The vector of explanatory variables, 𝐗𝒊,𝒕, is defined for each 
test below. 
 In the remainder of this section, I discuss my findings regarding the unconditional 
accuracy of EJR and S&P ratings, before considering the effects of accounting quality. 
Table 2 presents the results of these twelve regressions with two sets of independent 
variables. Panel A shows the incremental predictive power of S&P ratings, while Panel B 
shows the incremental power of EJR ratings. Both panels present estimates for the full 
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sample and the subsample of firms that are classified as speculative (i.e., excluding firm-
quarters in which both S&P and EJR issued ratings of BBB- or above). Table 2 reveals 
several findings. First, the coefficients on ejrating in Panel A and sprating in Panel B are 
positive and significant. The interpretation of this coefficient in both models is the 
association of credit ratings with future default when the S&P rating equals the EJR 
rating, which is why the coefficients are identical across the panels. The coefficient on 
spmejr in Panel A, which is the difference between the S&P and EJR rating, shows that 
S&P ratings that diverge from EJR ratings provide some additional explanatory power in 
estimating default risk, but it is only marginally significant at some horizons for the full 
sample and is insignificant beyond six quarters in the speculative sample. In contrast, 
Panel B shows that EJR ratings that diverge from S&P ratings (ejrmsp) are significant 
predictors of default at a 1% level across all horizons in both samples. Thus, EJR ratings 
that diverge from S&P ratings appear to provide incremental explanatory power more 
often than S&P ratings that diverge from EJR ratings.11 
To further assess the accuracy of the ratings, I calculate the accuracy ratio, which 
measures rating agencies’ propensity to assign lower ratings to firms that ultimately 
default relative to firms that do not. This ratio measures how well credit ratings avoid 
both Type I errors (granting poor ratings to firms that will not default) and Type II errors 
(granting relatively high ratings to firms that will default).12 A benefit of using the 
                                                          
11 The magnitude of the coefficients represents the marginal effect of the covariates on the log odds-ratio of 
default at each horizon, which is not very intuitive in and of itself. Marginal effects of each rating on the 
probability of default can be calculated, though they vary across levels of ratings. It is sufficient for my 
analysis to analyze statistical significance as a measure of the incremental contribution of the ratings in 
predicting default. 
12 See Engelmann, Hayden, and Tasche (2003) for more information on calculating the accuracy ratio. 
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accuracy ratio is that it is non-parametric, so it is not affected by functional form 
assumptions about the relationship between ratings and default probability. It is also a 
key metric used by the rating agencies to assess their own performance.  
 Table 3 presents the accuracy ratios for eight default horizons. Each row 
represents a different set of independent variables. EJR and S&P show accuracy ratios for 
models with the agency ratings – ejrating and sprating, respectively – as the only 
independent variable. The “both ratings” model includes both ejrating and sprating. 
Results are shown for both the full sample (Panels A & C) and the speculative sample 
(Panels B & D). Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the data in Table 3, 
Panels A and B. The modified Campbell row presents the accuracy ratios for the failure 
score (i.e. predicted probability of default) estimated using a modified version of the 
default prediction model of Campbell et al. (2008). The superior performance of the 
modified Campbell model makes it a suitable benchmark measure of default risk that I 
employ in tests described below. Figure 2 shows the relationship between EJR ratings 
and S&P ratings across default risk groups. Note that S&P ratings are greater than EJR 
ratings about 65% of the time for lowest risk group and only 15% of the time for the 
highest. Of course, the figures for EJR ratings > S&P ratings show the opposite trend. 
Recall that higher ratings are coded to worse/higher in default risk (AAA = 1, C = 21), so 
the interpretation of the graph is that EJR ratings capture default risk more effectively. 
Several notable results emerge from these tests. Both EJR and S&P perform better 
in the full sample than in the speculative sample. The accuracy ratios decline 
monotonically as the prediction horizon increases, which is expected since default is 
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more difficult to predict at longer horizons. Panels C & D present differences in the 
accuracy ratios and associated z-statistics.13 These panels show that EJR ratings have a 
higher accuracy ratio than S&P ratings across all horizons in both samples, and that the 
magnitude of the difference is larger in the speculative subsample. This result implies that 
EJR’s rating accuracy relative to S&P is even higher among firms that have higher 
default risk and those for which information is relatively valuable. The statistical 
significance diminishes at longer prediction horizons, but the overall evidence supports 
EJR’s predictive ability. Additionally, I compare each rating individually to the model 
with both ratings. There is not a significant difference between the accuracy of EJR 
ratings and the model with both ratings at any horizon, again supporting the idea that 
S&P ratings do not provide significant incremental information to EJR ratings for the 
purpose of predicting default. In contrast, the model with both ratings outperforms S&P 
ratings alone by a statistically significant margin at nearly all horizons. EJR ratings are 
more accurate than S&P ratings overall and provide superior incremental predictive 
power when added to S&P ratings. 
2.3.2 Earnings quality and rating accuracy 
2.3.2.1 Accuracy ratio tests 
 To assess the effect of earnings quality on rating accuracy and timeliness, I use 
measures of timely loss recognition and asymmetric timely loss recognition (Basu, 1997). 
Both are measured as the estimated coefficients from a piecewise-linear regression of 
earnings on stock returns. I estimate these measures following the procedure in 
                                                          
13 Z-statistics for testing the differences in accuracy ratios were formulated using jackknife standard errors 
for nonparametric statistics. See Newson (2006) for a description of the method. 
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Wittenberg-Moerman (2008), with two modifications. First, I include controls for lagged 
firm characteristics, as proposed by Ball et al. (2013). Second, I estimate by industry 
(three-digit SIC code) rather than industry-year to obtain a measure of a more persistent 
characteristic of earnings quality that is not affected by particular events that may 
coincide with changes in default risk.14 I also hope to avoid capturing earnings 
management with this measure, as I separately analyze the effect of discretionary 
accruals. 
 I examine the impact of earnings management using discretionary accruals 
estimated using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). This 
model separates total accruals (operating income minus operating cash flows) into its 
non-discretionary and discretionary components based on a model of changes in revenue, 
accounts receivable, and PP&E. The discretionary accruals are the residuals from this 
estimation. Thus, positive residuals represent positive discretionary accruals, or upward-
managed earnings. If discretionary accruals mislead credit rating agencies and cause 
inappropriate rating changes, then firms with high or low discretionary accruals (i.e. high 
absolute value of discretionary accruals) will have less accurate ratings. 
 I divide the sample at the median of each earnings timeliness measure and at the 
median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals. I then estimate equation (1) on 
each agency’s ratings separately for each earnings quality group and measure rating 
performance with the accuracy ratio. The results in Table 4, Panel A suggest that EJR is 
                                                          
14 Results continue to persist for most specifications using industry-year measures of TLR and ATLR. An 
exception is set of tests performed for the subset of defaulting firms. This is not surprising, as a default 
may be symptomatic of industry economic events that may influence the estimation of the measures in 
that particular period. 
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better at predicting default over most horizons when earnings have more timely loss 
recognition. This finding is consistent with relevant information being reflected in 
earnings more rapidly, leading EJR to be more responsive in adjusting its ratings 
appropriately. When earnings are asymmetrically timely, EJR ratings appear to be less 
accurate. This is consistent with hypothesis H1b, suggesting that biases in the balance 
sheet may not be recognized by EJR. The third result in Panel A shows that EJR is more 
accurate in predicting default up to six quarters ahead when the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is lower, but EJR ratings appear to be more accurate when 
discretionary accruals are high, particularly at longer horizons. As discretionary accruals 
are temporary and tend to reverse, it could be reasonably expected that the effect of 
current levels of discretionary accruals will dissipate over time. Overall, these findings 
are consistent with my hypotheses. 
 The results for S&P in Panel B show that the effect of earnings timeliness is less 
pronounced for S&P ratings than for EJR ratings. For each of the timeliness measures, 
there is a mix of positive and negative differences in accuracy across earnings quality 
groups. This is not consistent with the prediction that timeliness will increase S&P’s 
rating accuracy. With the exception of the anomalous results at the one quarter horizon, 
the effect of discretionary accruals on S&P’s rating accuracy is largely consistent with 
EJR and with hypothesis H1c. The inference is that S&P uses its private information 
consistently and, therefore, is not subject to timely loss recognition in earnings, but that it 
may be temporarily misled by issuer earnings management. 
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 Panel C displays the differences in accuracy ratios between EJR and S&P at each 
horizon and for each accounting quality group. In column 4 of the first portion of this 
panel, the 0.056 measures the difference between EJR’s and S&P’s accuracy ratios for 
the high TLR group. As expected, EJR performs better than S&P within this group. The 
0.022 in the “Low TLR” line shows that EJR also exceeds S&P for firms with less TLR. 
The “Difference” of 0.034 indicates that the performance of EJR relative to S&P in the 
high accounting quality group is greater than in the low accounting quality group. This 
difference-in-differences result is consistent with the expectation that S&P’s information 
advantage will lead it to perform relatively better compared to EJR when accounting 
quality is low. The difference is positive across most of the horizons for TLR, which 
supports this prediction. The ATLR results show that when earnings are more 
asymmetrically timely, EJR performs relatively worse. Again, it appears that EJR rating 
accuracy suffers from accounting bias more than S&P ratings because S&P has access to 
other information that limits their reliance on biased earnings, consistent with H1d. The 
final portion of the table shows the accuracy differences across discretionary accruals 
groups. These differences vary in sign and are not generally significant (with the 
exception of the one quarter horizon), indicating that EJR and S&P are similarly 
impacted by discretionary accruals. This finding is inconsistent with H1d. 
 Overall, these results suggest that EJR ratings become more accurate when losses 
are timely, but less accurate when losses are asymmetrically timely. These effects are 
present both in terms of absolute accuracy and accuracy relative to S&P, in support of my 
hypotheses that the effect of earnings quality will be greater for EJR than S&P. In 
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addition, the effect of discretionary accruals varies with the prediction horizon. However, 
these results should be interpreted with caution due to the relatively infrequent incidence 
of default. The number of defaults is approximately 100 at most horizons.15 This quantity 
is likely sufficient for tests involving the full sample, but when it is broken into groups it 
is possible for noise in the data to significantly impact accuracy ratios calculated with a 
limited sample of defaults. The problem is increased with the discretionary accruals 
measure, as data requirements further reduce the number of defaults. 
2.3.2.2 Failure score regressions 
 In order to overcome the lack of defaults in my sample available for use in 
prediction models, I replace the default indicator with the probability of default as 
represented by the failure score. The failure score is the predicted value from a logistic 
regression of default in the subsequent quarter on a set of accounting and market 
variables. Campbell et al. (2008) shows that this model is a more accurate default 
predictor than distance-to-default measures (Merton, 1974; Hillegeist et al., 2004) and 
S&P credit ratings. I create a “modified Campbell” model by adding cfotlavg and tang, 
which provide additional explanatory power. Cfotlavg is the weighted average cash flow 
scaled by total liabilities and is included in the well-known Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy 
prediction model. I add it to the Campbell model to allow for separate coefficients on 
accruals (represented by nimtaavg) and cash flows. Tang is asset tangibility, measured as 
net PP&E divided by total assets. Following Campbell et al. (2008) and Hilscher et al. 
(2013), I estimate the Campbell model using an “expanding window” approach, where 
                                                          
15 The actual number varies with horizon due to data availability. For example, data for a given default may 
be available four quarters prior to the default, but not one or eight quarters. 
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the model coefficients are re-estimated every year using data from 1990 through the prior 
year. Thus, the coefficients on the variables change over time. By using coefficients 
estimated using only past data, I avoid the look-ahead bias of estimation using the full 
sample. Table 5 provides the coefficients from estimating the model from 1990 – 2012 
using the sample of all firms with Mergent and Compustat coverage. The signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with Campbell et al. (2008) and with predicted relationships of 
each variable with default risk. Table 3 shows that the accuracy ratios for the modified 
Campbell score are larger than those for all of the ratings models, and that the differences 
are statistically significant through at least four quarters. This result supports my use of 
the failure score as a proxy for default risk. 
 To test the ability of credit ratings to capture default risk and identify how 
accounting quality alters this ability, I regress the failure score on credit rating levels 
interacted with the three accounting quality measures (TLR, ATLR, and DiscAcc). Panel 
A of Table 6 presents the results for EJR ratings. The first column presents the EJR rating 
(ejrating) and the incremental S&P rating (spmejr). The coefficient on ejrating is 
strongly positive, demonstrating that EJR ratings have considerable predictive power. 
The coefficient on spmejr is negative and significant, showing that S&P ratings 
incremental to EJR ratings has a negative association with the level of credit risk, 
suggesting that S&P ratings are poor predictors relative to EJR ratings because the 
incremental S&P rating predicts default risk in the opposite direction. The last three 
columns present the effects of accounting quality on EJR ratings. Consistent with 
hypothesis H1a, the interaction (AQ_EJR) between TLR and the credit rating is positive, 
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which implies that ratings are better able to predict default risk when firms provide more 
informative earnings. The interaction term for ATLR is also significantly positive, which 
suggests that rather than generating biased ratings, earnings with asymmetric loss 
recognition provide an information signal that helps rating agencies develop better 
ratings. This is consistent with the idea that this characteristic of accounting may be the 
equilibrium outcome of firms seeking to meet the demand for information (LaFond and 
Watts, 2008). The interaction between discretionary accruals (DiscAcc) and ejrating is 
negative, consistent with the idea that upward managed earnings can bias ratings and 
make them less accurate measures of default risk, but it is not statistically significant. 
This finding is not entirely surprising, as accruals reverse, so the impact of earnings 
management may not persist long enough to be reflected in the accuracy of ratings. As 
discussed in later sections, the effect is stronger when using changes specifications. 
The results in Panel B for S&P ratings are consistent with Panel A. The first 
column shows, without including accounting quality effects, EJR ratings provide 
significant predictive power incremental to that provided by S&P ratings. In addition, the 
interaction term in the TLR and ATLR columns is positive and significant, while the 
interaction with DiscAcc is negative but insignificant. 
Panel C presents the differential results of accounting quality on S&P and EJR. In 
this table, the coefficient of interest is the interaction between accounting quality and the 
difference between the S&P rating and EJR rating (AQ_spmejr). Because accounting 
quality is predicted to have a less significant impact on S&P ratings than EJR ratings, I 
expect this interaction to have a negative coefficient. However, it is not significantly 
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different from zero in any of the columns, showing that accounting quality has a 
comparable impact on both S&P and EJR. 
2.3.2.3 Rating change reversal tests 
 As an additional test of whether accounting bias leads to biased rating levels, I 
analyze rating change reversals. Specifically, I examine whether rating agencies issue a 
downgrade (upgrade) within one year following an upgrade (downgrade). It should be 
noted that a reversal is not necessarily an indication of poor ratings quality. If firms’ 
credit risk fluctuates, then the most timely and accurate rating may be the one that 
reverses most often. However, if the probability of a rating change reversal is correlated 
with biases in borrowers’ earnings due to earnings management or asymmetric loss 
recognition, it is more likely that a reversal is the correction of an erroneous rating 
change that was originally based on poor or inaccurate information. 
 In order to complete this analysis, I extract all rating changes from the sample of 
firms rated by both agencies. Table 9 presents estimates from a linear probability model 
where the dependent variable is Reverse, an indicator equal to one if the current rating 
change for a given agency is followed by a change in the opposite direction within 365 
days. The first independent variable is EJRdum, an indicator equal to one if the dependent 
variable relates to EJR ratings and zero for S&P. In this model, AQ represents either 
ATLR or DiscAcc. These are the two earnings quality measures that are predicted to 
induce bias in hypotheses H1b and H1c. EJR_AQ is the interaction between EJRdum and 
AQ, representing the incremental impact of accounting quality on EJR rating reversals. 
Ratelevel is included as a control variable equal to the value of the rating prior to the 
rating change. The columns labeled “Down” relate to downgrades and the “Up” columns 
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are upgrades. The first two columns are baseline specifications that show that EJR rating 
downgrades and upgrades are both significantly more likely to reverse than S&P rating 
changes, consistent with Bruno et al. (2013). The last four columns show that the 
accounting quality results are stronger for downgrades than for upgrades. Prior studies 
have shown that rating agencies tend to be more conservative in issuing upgrades, which 
means they tend to lag and are likely less impacted by current earnings (Beaver et al., 
2006). Relatively weak results on upgrades persist throughout subsequent testing, as well. 
The positive and significant coefficient on AQ in the ATLR down column indicate that 
S&P downgrades are more likely to reverse for firms with greater ATLR. It appears that 
S&P sometimes records overly conservative downgrades when firms’ earnings exhibit 
the negative bias associated with ATLR, and that it tends to reverse those downgrades 
within one year as the earlier earnings biases are revealed. Interestingly, the coefficient 
on the EJR_AQ interaction term is negative and significant. This coefficient offsets the 
main effects observed for S&P, so the total effect of ATLR on EJR reversals (AQ + 
EJR_AQ) is not significantly different from zero. The probability of EJR reversal does 
not depend on the level of earnings ATLR. The reversal results for discretionary accruals 
are not significant. This is consistent with the findings of our prior accuracy tests that do 
not provide evidence of bias caused by discretionary accruals. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the finding that ATLR increases 
the probability that S&P downgrades reverse, but it does not appear to affect EJR 
downgrades. First, EJR may be better than S&P at recognizing potential accounting 
biases and avoiding inappropriate downgrades that will be soon reversed. This 
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interpretation is at odds with my other results, which show that the effects of earnings 
quality are generally at least as significant for EJR ratings as they are for S&P ratings. 
Therefore, a more likely explanation is that EJR, like S&P, records downgrades that are 
biased by negative discretionary accruals and asymmetric recognition of losses, but that it 
fails to recognize and reverse those downgrades within one year. Collectively, these 
effects cause an accumulation of bias in EJR ratings that reduces its accuracy, which is 
consistent with my results in Table 4. 
2.3.3 Earnings quality and rating timeliness 
 The remainder of my analyses to test the news effect of accounting quality 
focuses on testing rating timeliness. When a borrower experiences a significant change in 
default risk, rating agencies should respond with a rating change. A more timely response 
is a signal of higher rating quality. This is a more powerful setting to test the effects of 
earnings quality, because earnings itself is a measure of the change in (as opposed to the 
level of) a company’s financial position. To test the responsiveness of credit ratings to 
changes in default risk, I utilize the modified Campbell failure score as a benchmark 
measure of default risk. 
To test the timely downgrade or upgrade by the rating agencies following a 
change in default risk, I examine six dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, ejrup, spup, 
downdiff, and updiff. The first two are indicators equal to one if the firm experiences a 
downgrade from EJR and S&P, respectively. The next two are similar indicators of 
upgrades. The variable downdiff (updiff) is equal to one if the firm is downgraded 
(upgraded) by EJR and not by S&P, negative one if the firm is downgraded (upgraded) 
by S&P and not EJR, and zero otherwise. These variables are regressed in a linear 
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probability model on a number of independent variables in Table 8. AQ is the accounting 
quality variable: TLR in Panel A, ATLR in Panel B, and DiscAcc in Panel C. Csup is an 
indicator equal to one if the rated firm experiences an increase in default risk, as 
measured by the failure score. The key variable in the downgrade specifications is the 
interaction of these two variables, AQ_csup. For TLR and ATLR, I expect a positive 
coefficient on this interaction. This would indicate that a rated entity with more 
informative earnings is more likely to be downgraded when their default risk increases. 
This would be because the increase in default risk is more likely to be reflected in 
earnings for firms with timely loss recognition. For DiscAcc, I expect a negative 
coefficient, as upward earnings management can obscure the increase in default risk. In 
the upgrade specifications, the key variable is AQ. This measures the incremental effect 
of accounting quality on the probability of an upgrade when there is a decrease in default 
risk. For TLR, there is no directional prediction for this coefficient, as this measure does 
not capture the timeliness of earnings with respect to good news. For ATLR, the 
coefficient should be negative because of the downward bias in earnings. For DiscAcc, 
the coefficient should be positive because upward earnings management may exaggerate 
the improvement in credit risk. I include as control variables campscore_lag, which is the 
lagged failure score level, and ejrating_lag, sprating_lag, and ejrmsp_lag, which are the 
lagged levels of EJR rating, S&P rating, and the difference between the two, respectively.  
 Table 6, Panel A presents the results for timely loss recognition. The positive 
coefficient on csup in the ejrdown and spdown columns indicates that, consistent with 
expectations, rating downgrades are more likely for both rating agencies when the firm 
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experiences an increase in default risk. The positive coefficient on csup in the downdiff 
column indicates that EJR is more likely than S&P to issue a downgrade when default 
risk increases, consistent with the overall evidence that EJR ratings appears to outperform 
S&P ratings as measures of default risk. The key coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and significant for both EJR and S&P downgrades, indicating that more timely 
loss recognition increases the probability that the agencies appropriately record a 
downgrade when default risk increases. The interaction term is not significant in the 
downdiff column, indicating that the effect of accounting quality on rating timeliness is 
not significantly different between the two rating agencies. 
Panel B presents the results for asymmetric timely loss recognition. For 
downgrades, the results are similar to those from Panel A and support the hypothesis that 
ATLR will improve the timeliness of ratings in recording rating downgrades when issuers 
have an increase in default risk. For upgrades, the effects of ATLR are mostly 
insignificant, consistent with our earlier finding that upgrades are less timely and, 
therefore, are less likely to be influenced by the characteristics of current earnings. 
 Panel C provides results related to discretionary accruals. In the ejrdown and 
spdown columns, the negative coefficients on the interaction terms show that the 
probability of a downgrade concurrent with an increase in default risk declines as 
discretionary accruals become more positive. This is consistent with my hypothesis. As 
expected, the results for EJR and S&P upgrades are weaker, though it is notable that the 
interaction term is positive, indicating that firms that manage earnings upward when they 
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experience an increase in default risk are more likely to receive a rating upgrade, which 
would also be consistent with rating agencies being misled. 
2.3.4 Controlling for conflicts of interest and private information 
2.3.4.1 The need for additional controls  
The results generally support my hypotheses for the news effects of accounting 
quality. Specifically, it appears that timely loss recognition in earnings and discretionary 
accruals affect the timeliness of rating downgrades as hypothesized, and timely loss 
recognition also affects the overall accuracy of ratings. It was somewhat surprising to 
find that the effects are comparable for both EJR and S&P despite S&P’s access to 
private information. As discussed in section 2.1.1, there are reasons that there may be a 
news effect of accounting quality for S&P ratings that could match the effect for EJR 
ratings. For example, S&P may lack adequate, cost-effective substitute information that 
would either make up for a lack of earnings timeliness or expose the bias in managed 
earnings. In addition, S&P’s market position may allow it to shirk on their monitoring 
without significantly harming its revenue. 
These reasons could explain the observed results, but there is also the possibility 
that conflicts of interest and private information quality are correlated omitted variables 
that created an upward bias in the effect of accounting quality for S&P. Because the 
issuer is the source of their revenue, S&P may feel pressure to provide inflated ratings in 
order to avoid losing their client and its future revenue to a competing firm. The level of 
these conflicts may be correlated with the quality of public information provided by rated 
firms. For example, a firm that puts pressure on the rating agency to inflate its rating may 
also provide biased accounting information or disclosures. In this case, if I exclude 
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conflict of interest proxies from the models, then the observed effect of good accounting 
quality may actually be the effect of low conflicts of interest. 
Another potential correlated variable is the quality of private information 
provided to the rating agency. A firm that provides biased or incomplete information to 
rating agencies may also do the same in their public financial reporting. Again, this 
positive correlation would create an upward bias in the observed accounting quality effect 
for a model that excludes a measure of private information. 
2.3.4.2 Measures of conflicts of interest 
To address the concern about omitted variable bias, I reperform some of the key 
analyses including controls for conflicts of interest. The conflict of interest measures are 
intended to capture several constructs, including regulatory pressure on the rating 
agencies, the likelihood that outside investors will recognize biased ratings, potential real 
effects of rating changes, expected future revenue from the issuer, and pressure from the 
issuer based on the CEO’s compensation structure. In particular, I include the following: 
 Bbb: This is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s S&P credit rating is 
equal to BBB-, BBB, or BBB+. BBB is the lowest rating a firm can have and still 
be considered investment grade. If a firm’s rating falls below investment grade, it 
will lose access to a number of institutional investors, such as pensions, who limit 
their investment to investment grade only (Kraft, 2010). In addition, it is difficult 
for firms with a long-term rating below BBB to obtain the short-term ratings 
necessary to access the commercial paper market (Kisgen, 2006). As a result, 
firms with a BBB rating will be particularly concerned about avoiding 
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downgrades, putting additional pressure on the rating agency to maintain an 
inflated rating. 
 Financial: This is an indicator equal to one for financial firms (three digit SIC 
code between 600 – 641). Kedia et al. (2014) find that Moody’s caters to financial 
firms, which are frequent issuers of debt, including structured debt instruments. 
S&P may also cater to them in order to preserve the revenue opportunities from 
rating future securities. 
 Propstd: This is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s ratio of short-term debt to 
total debt is greater than the sample median. Strobl and Xia (2012) find that 
S&P’s conflicts of interest are more severe for firms with more short-term debt. 
The motivation behind this measure is that these firms are likely to issue 
additional debt upon the maturity of their existing debt, which will provide future 
revenue opportunities for S&P. As a result, they may cater to these firms. 
 Presox: This is an indicator variable equal to one for observations occurring prior 
to 2002, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) 
find improvement in the quality of credit ratings after 2002, ostensibly due to the 
increased regulatory pressure and investor criticism following the Enron and 
Worldcom debacles. As a result, in the pre-SOX era, rating agencies were more 
likely to cater to issuers at the expense of accurate ratings. 
 Ewr6: This is an indicator equal to one for observations occurring following six 
months of equally-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index returns that are 
greater than the sample median. Bolton et al. (2012) present an analytical model 
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showing that rating agencies will tend to cater to investors and inflate ratings 
during booms when investors are more trusting. 
 Indlevmed: This indicator is equal to one for firms in an industry where the 
median leverage is greater than the sample median. This is another proxy for 
future revenue. Agencies that cover firms in industries that carry more leverage 
will have more rating business in the future. 
 Ltd: This is an indicator equal to one if the firm’s total long-term debt is greater 
than the sample median. This is proxy both for large firms, which may feel they 
can pressure the rating agencies into inflating ratings, as well as for potential 
future revenue, which will be greater for firms with more debt. 
2.3.4.3 Measures of private information quality 
The private information measures are designed to capture optimistic bias held by 
issuer management, the overall accuracy of management’s private information, and the 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. The measures are: 
 Pin: This is an indicator equal to one if the Probability of Informed Trade (PIN) is 
greater than the sample median. PIN is a measure of information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors in equity markets developed by 
Easley et al. (2002) and modified by Venter and de Jongh (2006). Although rating 
agencies operate in debt markets rather than equity markets, I assume that the 
private information held by informed traders is relevant for valuing both types of 
securities and that the overall level of asymmetry is positively correlated across 
markets. In my study, S&P is considered the informed party due to their access to 
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management, while EJR is relatively uninformed, relying solely on public 
information. Therefore, PIN represents the difference in information available to 
S&P and EJR.16 
 Tenure: This is an indicator equal to one if the CEO tenure is greater than the 
sample median. CEO tenure is one of several measures of CEO overconfidence 
adopted from Schrand and Zechman (2012). A longer-tenured CEO may be 
overconfident because he over-weights the role of his own ability in prior 
successes. Overconfident executives will likely communicate optimistically 
biased private information to rating agencies, so tenure is an inverse measure of 
the accuracy of private information. 
 Varpay: This is a measure of the variable portion of CEO compensation, 
measured as (total compensation – fixed salary)/total compensation from 
Execucomp. This is a measure of the relationship between CEO compensation 
and the performance of the form. The stronger this relationship is, the more likely 
the CEO is to provide biased information to rating agencies or to pressure rating 
agencies to inflate ratings. The variable is an indicator equal to one if the above 
ratio is greater than the sample median. 
 Score_oc4: This is an indicator variable adopted from Schrand and Zechman 
(2012) that captures executive overconfidence. If the sum of the following four 
measures is greater than or equal to three, then this variable is equal to one: 
                                                          
16 I obtained quarterly PIN data from Professor Stephen Brown’s web site. The data is that used in Brown 
and Hillegeist (2007), extended through 2010. 
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o Excess investment: the residual from a quarterly cross-sectional regression 
of total asset growth on sales growth, adjusted for the industry (two-digit 
SIC) median for that quarter. This is set equal to one if it is greater than 
zero and zero otherwise. 
o Excess acquisitions: net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows, 
adjusted for the industry-quarter median. This is set equal to one if it is 
greater than zero and zero otherwise. 
o Excess leverage: the ratio of current and long-term debt to the sum of 
current debt, long-term debt, and the book value of shareholders’ equity, 
adjusted for the industry-quarter median. This is set equal to one if it is 
greater than zero and zero otherwise. 
o Risky debt: an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has convertible 
debt or preferred stock greater than zero. 
 Score_oc5: This measure of executive overconfidence is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the sum of five measures is greater than or equal to three. The first 
four measures are those described under score_oc4, above. The fifth measure is 
dividend yield, equal to zero if the firm paid dividends on common stock over the 
prior twelve months and equal to one if it did not. 
 Option_oc: To calculate this variable, I first obtain the value of in-the-money 
unexercised exercisable options held by the CEO and scale this amount by the 
CEO’s total holdings. I then multiply this ratio by 100 to get a percentage. If this 
amount is greater than the industry-quarter median, then this variable is equal to 
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one. Otherwise, it is equal to zero. The degree to which CEOs delay exercising 
options is a reflection of their overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Schrand and Zechman, 2012). 
 Purch180: An indicator variable equal to 1 if the net insider purchases (volume of 
purchases – volume of sales) divided by shares outstanding over the 180 days 
prior to the start of the quarter were greater than zero. I limit insider sales and 
purchases to open market transactions, as in Jagolinzer et al. (2011). This variable 
is intended to capture executive optimism, as insider purchases imply a belief that 
the stock will generate positive abnormal returns. 
 Alpha180: This is a measure of the profitability of insider trades made over the 
180 days prior to the start of the quarter. Following Jagolinzer et al. (2011), I net 
all insider transactions on a given day and treat them as a single transaction. I then 
measure profitability as the alpha from the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997) model estimated over the 180 days following each transaction. I calculate 
the average alpha of all transactions over the 180 day period, with each 
transaction’s alpha weighted by the number of shares traded divided by the total 
volume of insider trades over the period. The measure is an indicator equal to one 
if the alpha is greater than the sample median. If management makes profitable 
insider trades, this is an indication that they have accurate private information. If 
this information is transferred to S&P through its interactions with management, 
then this will be a proxy for the quality of S&P’s private information. 
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2.3.4.4 Effects of accounting quality after controlling for conflicts of interest and private 
information 
 To test the robustness of the rating accuracy results to the inclusion of controls for 
conflicts of interest and private information, I first reperform the regressions of the 
modified Campbell failure score on credit ratings and accounting quality originally 
shown in Table 6. Recall that this test is performed to measure the ability of credit ratings 
to capture the level of default risk. I add the conflict of interest variables individually to 
the model, as well as an interaction between the conflict of interest measure and the credit 
rating of interest. The results are shown in Table 9. Because of the large number of 
conflict of interest measures, I show only the interaction between the accounting quality 
measure and the credit rating. Panel A shows the results for Egan-Jones Ratings. The 
effect of TLR is attenuated somewhat from the original results, but remains fairly 
consistent overall. The effect of ATLR remains positive and significant, while the impact 
of discretionary accruals remains insignificant. Panel B provides the comparable results 
for S&P ratings. The effect of all three accounting quality variables remains consistent 
with the original analysis. Similarly, Panel C shows the incremental effect of accounting 
quality on S&P ratings compared to EJR ratings. Based on these robustness tests, it 
appears that effect of accounting quality on credit rating accuracy is not driven by 
omitted conflict of interest variables. 
 Table 10 then presents the original results from Table 6 after adding controls for 
the quality of private information and private information interacted with credit ratings. 
The results are comparable to those in Table 9. The effect of accounting quality on the 
accuracy of EJR ratings is weakened somewhat, particularly for TLR, which is surprising 
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because EJR should not be directly affected by the characteristics of firms’ private 
information. It is possible that these variables are correlated with the quality of other non-
earnings public disclosures that provide more information to EJR. Overall, the 
coefficients remain consistently positive and are significant in enough specifications to 
suggest that more timely loss recognition does improve rating accuracy. Panel B presents 
the results for S&P. Interestingly, the effects of earnings timeliness continue to be 
significant, even though private information should be more relevant for S&P than EJR. 
Panel C is generally consistent with the original, in that there does not appear to be a 
significant difference in the news effect of accounting quality between S&P and EJR. It is 
notable that a few of the coefficients on the interaction with discretionary accruals are 
now significantly positive, which suggests that the negative effects of earnings 
management on rating accuracy may be stronger for EJR than for S&P, which is 
consistent with my initial hypothesis that the news effect should be greater for EJR. 
However, these results are relatively weak. 
 I then test the robustness of the rating timeliness results originally presented in 
Table 8. These tests examine whether higher accounting quality increases the probability 
that rating agencies record a downgrade when the rated firm has a default risk increase. I 
reperform these analyses including controls for conflicts of interest and private 
information interacted with csup, the indicator equal to one if the issuer’s failure score 
increases. Table 11 shows the results after controlling for conflicts of interest. Due to the 
large number of control specifications, I only present the coefficients on the interaction 
between accounting quality and csup. Panels A and B show that the effect of accounting 
44 
 
quality persists after controlling for all conflict of interest measures. Panel C shows that 
the effect continues to be consistent for both S&P and EJR. Table 12 shows similar 
results after controlling for the private information quality measures. The coefficients on 
TLR and ATLR continue to be positive and significant for both firms, and the coefficient 
on discretionary accruals is negative and significant. Panel C shows that the effects are 
consistent for both agencies. Overall, the results of these robustness tests show that the 
observed effect of accounting quality on credit rating accuracy and timeliness is not 
driven by conflicts of interest or the quality of private information. 
 
3. How is credit rating quality impacted by the discipline effect and 
private information overlap of accounting information? 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
3.1.1 Conflicts of interest and the discipline effect of accounting quality 
Information is the critical tool necessary for investors to monitor a firm. 
Information asymmetry between the management of debt issuers and investors, combined 
with their imperfectly aligned incentives, is what creates a market for credit rating 
agencies, which serve as intermediaries to reduce the information gap between those 
parties. However, there is also information asymmetry between rating agencies and 
investors, who do not have perfect insight into the credit rating process. If the rating 
agencies’ only objective is to provide very accurate ratings, then the information 
asymmetry does not harm investors. Unfortunately, analytical and empirical studies 
suggest rating agencies that are paid by debt issuers may issue inflated ratings and delay 
rating downgrades in order to satisfy their clients (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Manso, 
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2013; Bruno et al., 2013). Rating agencies are able to issue slow or inflated ratings 
because it is difficult for investors or regulators to observe this behavior. In order to 
identify poor ratings, investors need other information signals against which to compare 
the rating. One clear example of this would be an issuer default or bankruptcy. When an 
issuer defaults, it is easy to see that rating agencies did a poor job if they had the firm 
rated as investment grade until one week before the default. 
The publicly issued financial statements of the issuer are another information 
source. If earnings provide an accurate signal of a deterioration in the issuer’s 
creditworthiness, rating agencies may feel compelled to issue a rating downgrade to 
avoid the appearance that they are ignoring negative information. If earnings accurately 
and promptly impounds negative news, this will put additional pressure on rating 
agencies to incorporate the news in their ratings. The result is that higher quality earnings 
will improve the quality of credit ratings. This is consistent with prior studies that have 
examined the discipline effect of information in various contexts. For example, Biddle et 
al. (2009) find that higher financial reporting quality constrains managers’ propensity to 
over- or underinvest, thereby improving firms’ efficiency. In another particularly relevant 
study, Fong et al. (2014) find that equity analyst coverage provides a public information 
signal that constrains the rating agencies’ ability to inflate credit ratings.  
Note that the discipline effect is distinct from the news effect discussed in section 
2 of the paper. The news effect implies that rating agencies are receiving new information 
from public financial statements. The discipline effect occurs because the rating agency is 
privately informed about bad news prior to its public disclosure, but it chooses to ignore 
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that information until it becomes public and becomes a threat to their reputation. The 
discipline effect also has separate empirical implications, leading to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2a: If there is a discipline effect of accounting in addition to the news effect, the 
positive association between timely loss recognition (TLR and ATLR) and credit 
rating accuracy and timeliness will be more pronounced when the credit rating 
agency has greater conflicts of interest. The negative relationship between 
discretionary accruals and credit rating quality will also be stronger when there 
are greater conflicts of interest. 
Because I also use accounting restatements as a public information signal and an inverse 
measure of past accounting quality, I also predict the following: 
H2b: Firms announcing an adverse accounting restatement will be more likely to 
receive a credit rating downgrade when the credit rating agency has greater 
conflicts of interest. 
The idea behind this is that a credit rating agency that has private information will likely 
be able to anticipate the restatement, or will at least have other information that makes it 
less susceptible to the misstated accounting numbers. If the rating agency incorporates its 
negative private information into its rating prior to the restatement, it should not need to 
update its rating based on the information in the restatement itself. However, if the 
agency chooses to ignore the negative private information until it becomes public, it will 
be more likely to record a downgrade when the restatement is announced. 
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3.1.2 Private information overlap 
S&P and other issuer-paid rating agencies have direct access to management and 
expend significant resources developing their ratings. As a result, private information 
should play a significant role in the development of ratings. If the agency has accurate 
and precise private information, it should then produce more informative ratings. In this 
sense, there is a news effect of private information similar to the effect of public 
accounting information analyzed in section 2. Prior studies have shown that private, soft 
information improves the quality of agency-issued credit ratings (Kraft, 2012), as well as 
banks’ internal credit ratings (Lehmann, 2003). 
If a rating agency has private information, it may utilize less accounting 
information. Butler and Cornaggia (2012) find that rating agencies that gather more 
“soft” information rely less on accounting information in developing their ratings. In 
contrast, if a rating agency has no private information, like EJR, it has no choice but to 
rely entirely on accounting and other sources of public information. If financial reports 
are biased or slow to incorporate new information, a rating agency with no access to 
private information will likely issue biased or slow ratings due to a lack of alternative 
sources. The agency with private information will be able to consider both sources, and 
should be less subject to the quality of accounting. In other words, when accounting 
quality is relatively poor, it will be subsumed by private information. When accounting 
quality is good, it will still have significant overlap with the privately obtained 
information. 
However, if private information is biased or slow relative to accounting 
information, then the rating agencies with private information will place more weight on 
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the more reliable accounting data. Again, in this situation, there will be less overlap, or 
redundancy, between accounting information and private information. Despite its access 
to private information, the quality of the credit ratings it produces will be a function of 
accounting quality. Therefore, more information overlap between accounting and private 
information reduces the impact of accounting quality on rating quality. This is formalized 
in the following hypothesis: 
H2c: The positive association between timely loss recognition (TLR and ATLR) 
and credit rating accuracy and timeliness will be more pronounced when the 
credit rating agency has relatively less private information or more biased private 
information. The negative relationship between discretionary accruals and credit 
rating quality will also be stronger when the quality of private information is poor. 
In the context of accounting restatements, a rating agency with more accurate private 
information should be aware of the negative information in an adverse accounting 
restatement prior to its public release. As a result: 
H2d: Firms announcing an adverse accounting restatement will be more likely to 
receive a credit rating downgrade when the rating agency has a lower level of 
private information or if that information is optimistically biased. 
3.1.3 Interaction of conflicts of interest and private information 
 If the discipline and information overlap effects exist individually, then the 
interaction between the two should also modify the effect of accounting quality on credit 
rating quality. Recall that the disciplining effect of accounting quality means it will 
improve rating quality more significantly when the rating agency has relatively high 
levels of conflicts of interest. In the context of my models, the interaction between 
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conflicts of interest and accounting quality is expected to be positive. However, the 
existence of the discipline effect also depends on the amount and quality of private 
information. If the rating agency has very precise negative private information, it will be 
less likely to fully ignore it, even in the presence of conflicts of interest. On the other 
hand, if a rating agency is receiving biased or noisy private information, it may not fully 
recognize the extent of bad news and, therefore, will find it easier to cater to the issuer’s 
wishes. It will then only downgrade its ratings based on negative public information, 
which it does to protect its reputation, as described earlier. As a result, the impact of 
conflicts of interest will be stronger when the quality of private information is poor. 
 Considering now the reverse causal relationship, conflicts of interest can also alter 
the overlap effect of private information. The overlap effect implies that accounting 
quality will have a more significant impact on rating quality when there is less overlap 
with private information, i.e. when private information is relatively limited or biased. 
This is because when the rating agency incorporates high quality private information, it 
will depend less on the quality of accounting. However, when the rating agency has 
significant conflicts of interest, it will choose not to incorporate all (negative) private 
information into its ratings. Instead, it will wait until that information becomes public 
through the financial statements, thereby making the quality of its ratings subject to the 
quality of public information. In other words, when conflicts of interest are severe, the 
overlap effect of private information is weakened and the effect of accounting quality is 
strengthened. The overall takeaway is that the accounting quality effect is strongest when 
conflicts of interest are high and private information quality is low. 
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 To investigate these interactions, I focus on the announcement of accounting 
restatements as information signals and as indicators of bias in prior periods’ financial 
statements. While my earlier tests have the benefit of testing the usefulness of recognized 
measures of accounting quality, restatements provide a potentially more powerful setting 
to identify the interaction between the discipline and private information overlap effects. 
When a firm restates its financial statements, it publicly acknowledges errors in 
previously issued statements that may cause those statements to be unreliable. It is one of 
the cleaner available measures of accounting bias. I also have the advantage of being able 
to identify the point in time at which the company publicly disclosed the restatement. If a 
rating agency responds to an unfavorable accounting restatement (one that reduces 
previously reported earnings and/or net assets) by downgrading the firm’s rating, there 
are two possible reasons. First, the agency may have relied on prior financial statements 
because it had biased or poor private information, so the restatement came as a surprise. 
The other possibility is that the agency may have been aware of the optimistic bias in 
prior financials, but it chose not to correct for this bias because of conflicts of interest that 
led it to maintain an inflated rating and wait until the financial statements were publicly 
corrected to issue a downgrade. The interactive effect explained above leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H2e: Firms announcing an adverse accounting restatement will be most likely to 
receive a credit rating downgrade when the rating agency has limited or biased 
private information and relatively severe conflicts of interest. 
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Recall that EJR, as an investor-paid rating agency, does not have access to private 
information and should not be subject to the same conflicts of interest faced by S&P.  
H2f: The relationship between accounting quality and EJR rating accuracy and 
timeliness should not be affected by conflicts of interest and private information 
in the manner described in H2a – H2e. Those effects should only be observed for 
S&P. 
Because the above hypotheses should not apply to EJR, I include them as a 
control group to strengthen the interpretation of my findings. In each specification, I 
compare the results for EJR and S&P. If the findings for S&P are consistent with the 
hypotheses, but I find the same results apply to EJR, it will cast doubt on the 
interpretation of the findings as capturing the effects of conflicts of interest or private 
information. However, if the results are significant for S&P and not EJR, this strengthens 
their interpretation as such. 
3.2 Sample and descriptive statistics 
 The analysis to identify the discipline and private information overlap effects of 
accounting quality in this section of the paper utilizes the same core sample of firms rated 
by S&P and EJR that was used in section 2. However, I focus more on conflicts of 
interest and private information variables. The conflict of interest variables are obtained 
from Compustat, CRSP, and S&P Ratings Xpress. Private information variables came 
from Compustat, Execucomp, and the Thomson Insider database. Accounting restatement 
data was taken from Audit Analytics. For more detail on individual variables, refer to 
Appendix A. The descriptive statistics on these additional variables are found in Table 1, 
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Panel A. The correlation matrices for the conflict of interest and private information 
measures are found in Panels C and D. 
3.3 Empirical analysis and results 
3.3.1 Direct effects of conflicts of interest and private information 
 Before testing hypotheses H2a-H2f, I first examine the direct effects of conflicts 
of interest and private information measures on the accuracy and timeliness of credit 
ratings. Although I don’t formally test any hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
conflicts of interest, private information and credit rating quality without considering 
accounting quality, I include this analysis to validate the measures and examine whether 
they affect credit ratings as I expect. 
 In order to identify how conflicts of interest and private information quality 
impact the quality of credit ratings, I reperform two earlier tests, replacing the accounting 
quality measures with the conflicts and private information variables. In particular, to test 
the rating accuracy effect, I regress the modified Campbell failure score on the credit 
ratings, conflict or private information variable, and the interaction of the two. The key 
coefficient is the interaction term, which signifies how the correlation between the credit 
rating and default risk varies with conflicts or private information. See sections 2.3.4.2 
and 2.3.4.3 for a description of the variables. 
 The second test I reperform is the rating timeliness test using three dependent 
variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff. The first two are indicator variables equal to 
one if the issuer receives a rating downgrade from EJR and S&P, respectively. The 
variable downdiff is equal to one if the firm is downgraded by EJR and not by S&P, 
negative one if the firm is downgraded by S&P and not EJR, and zero otherwise. These 
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variables are regressed on csup, an indicator equal to one if the firm’s failure score 
increases during the quarter, the measures of conflicts and private information, and the 
interaction of the measures with csup. Again, the interaction term is the key figure, as it 
describes the incremental effect of conflicts of interest or private information quality on 
the probability of a downgrade when the firm’s default risk increases. I include the 
lagged failure scores and lagged credit ratings as control variables. 
 The results of these tests for conflicts of interest are found in Tables 13 and 14. 
The interaction terms should be equal to zero for EJR, as they should not be subject to 
conflicts of interest. Panel A of both tables shows that several of the coefficients are 
significant, suggesting that the measures are likely capturing more than just conflicts of 
interest. This does not invalidate their use in the study, but calls attention to the 
importance of considering both the effect on the individual agencies’ ratings and the 
differential effect between S&P and EJR. The coefficients should be negative for S&P, as 
conflicts of interest would be expected to reduce rating quality (Becker and Milbourn, 
2011; Manso, 2013; Bruno et al., 2013). Of course, this would imply that the incremental 
impact of conflicts of interest on S&P ratings relative to EJR ratings should also be 
negative. Panel B of both tables shows the results for S&P, while Panel C shows the 
differential effect between S&P and EJR (CI_spmejr in Table 13, CI_csup in Table 14).17 
Overall, the results are mixed, but the measures that follow expectations most closely are 
                                                          
17 Note that the coefficient on CI_spmejr in Table 13 represents the effect for S&P incremental to EJR, 
while CI_csup in Table 14 is the effect for EJR incremental to S&P, so the predicted sign should be 
positive for the former and negative for the latter. 
54 
 
the measures of long-term debt (ltd), proximity to the investment grade threshold (bbb), 
financial firms (financial), and the proportion of short-term debt (propstd). 
 The results for private information measures are presented in Tables 15 and 16. 
Again, the coefficients should be zero for EJR. However, the directional prediction for 
S&P varies across these measures. Pin and alpha180 are measures that capture high 
quality private information, while the remaining variables capture optimistic bias in 
private information. The former measures should be positively associated with rating 
accuracy and timeliness, while the rest should be negatively associated. Panel A of both 
tables shows that EJR rating quality is associated with several of the private information 
measures, again indicating that the measures may be capturing multiple constructs. 
Panels B and C show that a few of the measures show little association with rating 
quality, and none behave perfectly in line with expectations. However, score_oc4 and 
alpha180 generally outperform the rest. 
3.3.2 Rating accuracy tests 
 To examine whether there is a discipline effect of accounting quality on rating 
accuracy, I again run regressions with the failure score as the dependent variable. I 
estimate separate models for each rating agency, in addition to a third specification that 
includes the difference between the S&P rating and the EJR rating (spmejr) to capture the 
incremental effects for S&P ratings relative to EJR ratings. The independent variables for 
the EJR and S&P specifications are the credit rating value (ejrating / sprating), the 
accounting quality variable, the conflict of interest variable, and the full set of 
interactions between them. For the third specification, the independent variables include 
all of those in the EJR specification, plus spmejr fully interacted with the accounting 
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quality and conflict of interest measures. The coefficients of interest are the three way 
interactions between accounting quality, conflicts of interest, and the ratings (ejrating, 
sprating, and spmejr, respectively). Each of the three specifications is run for each 
accounting quality – conflict of interest variable combination. With three accounting 
quality variables and six conflict variables, this means each of the three specifications is 
run 18 times. 
Table 17 contains the results. For practicality, only the interaction of interest is 
presented. The results provide limited evidence to support the existence of a discipline 
effect. The coefficients for the EJR specification are mostly insignificant, as predicted, 
with the exception of the interactions with presox. For the S&P and spmejr models, the 
coefficients on interactions with TLR and ATLR should be positive and the interaction 
with DiscAcc should be negative. The coefficients in the S&P models are almost entirely 
insignificant, meaning the effect of accounting quality on S&P rating accuracy does not 
appear to vary with the level of conflicts of interest. The incremental impact on S&P 
compared to EJR, shown in the spmejr section, provide some results consistent with 
predictions for three of the six conflicts of interest variables. This provides some 
supporting evidence, though the results for these variables do not remain consistent in the 
timeliness tests discussed in section 3.3.3. 
I run the identical test to look for the effect of private information overlap, except 
I replace the measures of conflicts of interest with private information measures. With 
three accounting quality measures and eight private information measures, there are 24 
estimates for each of the three specifications. As a result, Table 18 shows only the 
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coefficients on the interaction between accounting quality, the credit rating (or 
incremental rating), and private information. This table shows little evidence of the 
overlap effect. The interactions between the optimistic private information measures and 
TLR/ATLR should be positive for S&P and spmejr, while the interactions with DiscAcc 
should be negative. Pin and alpha180, which measure private information quality, have 
the opposite predictions. Table 18 contains relatively few statistically significant 
coefficients. The two exceptions are score_oc5 and purch180, which show some 
evidence that optimistic private information makes accounting quality a more important 
factor in determining the accuracy of credit ratings. On the whole, however, the evidence 
to support the effect of private information is limited. 
3.3.3 Rating timeliness tests 
3.3.3.1 Downgrades in response to increases in default risk 
To determine whether accounting quality has a discipline effect on rating 
timeliness, I again utilize the timeliness test with three dependent variables: ejrdown, 
spdown, and downdiff, as defined in previous sections and in Appendix A. The 
independent variables are csup (the indicator for a failure score increase), the accounting 
quality variables, and the conflict of interest variables. These variables are fully 
interacted, and I include the lagged failure scores and lagged credit ratings as control 
variables. The coefficients of interest are the three way interactions between accounting 
quality, conflicts of interest, and csup. Each of the three specifications is run for each 
accounting quality – conflict of interest variable combination. The coefficients on the 
interaction term are displayed in Table 19. It is immediately apparent that very few are 
statistically different from zero. In addition, half of those that are significant are in the 
57 
 
wrong direction. Based on the preponderance of coefficients that don’t meet expectations, 
there appears to be little evidence for a discipline effect of earnings quality. 
To test the impact of private information quality on the accounting quality effect, 
I perform the same analysis, replacing the conflict of interest variables with private 
information measures. The coefficients on the interaction between csup, the accounting 
quality variables, and the private information measures are shown in Table 20. Similar to 
Table 19, the majority of interactions do not load. Interestingly, only purch180 appears to 
interact with accounting quality to affect S&P rating timelines as expected. The positive 
and significant coefficients on the interaction with TLR and ATLR are consistent with 
the notion that timely loss recognition more significantly improves timeliness of 
downgrades for firms that have optimistic private information based on the balance of 
insider trades. The negative coefficient on the interaction with DiscAcc implies that the 
combination of earnings management and optimistic private information reduce the 
timeliness of downgrades more than either of these biases do individually. However, 
these findings are outweighed by the lack of evidence found for other measures, so this 
analysis does not strongly support hypothesis H2c. 
3.3.3.2 Rating timeliness near default 
 After failing to find support for the discipline effect of accounting quality using 
the above specifications and measures of conflicts of interest, I use an alternative 
approach and focus on the subset of firms that experience a default. This is a powerful 
research setting where the potential reputational cost of failing to predict defaults should 
outweigh the incentives to cater to the issuers. This is particularly true because defaulting 
issuers often enter bankruptcy and are unlikely to be a significant source of revenue in the 
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near future. As a result, S&P should utilize its information advantage and be less reliant 
on accounting quality relative to the more general setting analyzed in previous tests. In 
those tests, I observed a similar effect of accounting quality on the timeliness of both 
S&P’s and EJR’s ratings. Using EJR as a benchmark, if I find that S&P ratings are 
affected by accounting quality less than EJR ratings in this low conflict of interest setting, 
this would be evidence that accounting quality has a greater impact on S&P ratings when 
it is facing higher conflicts of interest (i.e. when rating the broad set of firms as compared 
to firms close to default). 
 I employ two measures of rating timeliness from Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) to 
assess how each agency performs within one year of default. For these tests, my sample 
is limited to those firms that ultimately experience a default. The first measure is dahead, 
which is the number of days prior to default that the agency downgrades the firm’s rating, 
so a larger value indicates a more timely downgrade. The sample is composed of one 
observation for each rating downgrade by an individual agency that takes place within 
360 days prior to default. So, if a firm that defaults has EJR downgrades at 200 days and 
100 days prior to default and S&P downgrades at 175 days and 90 days, there will be 4 
observations related to that default. In this way, each agency is given credit for its early 
downgrades, but penalized for the later ones. 
 The second measure is wrate, which is the weighted average rating during the 
year leading up to default. This measure complements the first one, similar to performing 
levels versus changes analyses. Assuming that new information regarding the decline in 
default risk is yet to be incorporated in ratings one year prior to default, dahead captures 
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how quickly the rating agencies recognize the increasing default risk and issue 
downgrades. Wrate measures the overall level of the rating, so it is affected by not only 
the timeliness of rating changes, but also the rating as of the beginning of the year and the 
magnitude of the rating changes during the year. Using OLS, I regress dahead and wrate 
on the accounting quality variables and EJRdum, an indicator equal to one if the 
dependent variable relates to EJR ratings and zero for S&P. I also include the interaction 
of the two, which measures the incremental impact of accounting quality on the 
timeliness of EJR ratings relative to S&P. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 for the wrate specification 
include 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑎𝑑𝑗, 𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑡𝑙, and 𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑎, all defined in Appendix A and measured as of one 
year prior to the default.  The dahead specification includes the same controls plus 
𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, the credit rating level as of one year prior to default. 
 The results for dahead are shown in Table 21. For TLR and ATLR, the coefficient 
on AQ is positive and significant at a 10% level, which indicates that S&P rating 
downgrades are more timely for firms with more timely loss recognition. The coefficient 
on the interaction term is also positive and significant, indicating that the impact of TLR 
and ATLR on rating timeliness is greater for EJR than for S&P. This is consistent with 
hypothesis H2c and the existence of a discipline effect of accounting. However, the 
results for DiscAcc are not significant. This may be due to the misspecification of the 
modified Jones model for firms in significant financial distress. 
 Table 22 presents the results for the weighted average ratings, wrate, in the year 
leading to default. The coefficients on AQ for TLR and ATLR are positive but not 
significant. This indicates that earnings timeliness does not significantly impact the 
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timeliness of S&P ratings in the year prior to default. The interaction term, EJRdum_AQ, 
is positive and significant, suggesting that EJR ratings timeliness continues to benefit 
from more timely loss recognition. This is further evidence in support of the discipline 
effect of accounting quality. However, consistent with the dahead analysis, the effect of 
discretionary accruals continues to be insignificant. 
3.3.3.3 Accounting restatement analysis 
 As discussed in section 3.1.3, accounting restatements provide a powerful setting 
to examine the effects of accounting information, conflicts of interest, and private 
information, as well as the interaction of the three. Accounting restatements are signals of 
prior accounting bias, as well as a public disclosure event that is easily observed by the 
public. Restatements are often announced separately in an 8-K filing, though they may 
also be included with other information in a 10-K or 10-Q. There are approximately 454 
adverse accounting restatements in the sample and 100 favorable restatements, 
representing approximately 1.5% and 0.35% of the main sample, respectively. Similar to 
earlier tests, I use ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff as dependent variables. In my first test, 
I regress them on res_adv, an indicator variable equal to one if the rated firm announces 
an adverse accounting restatement during the quarter. As control variables, I initially 
include res_fav¸ which is an indicator equal to one if the firm announces a favorable 
restatement, and the lagged credit rating. The results of this specification are shown in the 
first three columns of Table 23. The coefficients on res_adv is positive and significant for 
both EJR and S&P, indicating that both are more likely to record downgrades when the 
firm announces a restatement. This coefficient is also significant when downdiff is the 
dependent variable, implying that EJR is more likely than S&P to record a downgrade 
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when a restatement is announced. This is consistent with the hypothesis that EJR ratings 
are more reliant on public information, and thus a restatement is more likely to be news 
to them. In the last three columns, I include controls for the lagged failure score and the 
change in the failure score during the quarter. This has the potential to bias the coefficient 
on res_adv toward zero because the change in failure score will incorporate at least some 
portion of the negative impact of the restatement. However, it is critical to include this 
control to show that the effect of the restatement is not just reflecting the change in 
default risk, but that it incrementally increases the probability of a downgrade, implying 
that the upward bias in the prior financial statements was not fully accounted for by the 
rating agencies. For EJR, this would be due to the news effect of the restatement. For 
S&P, it could be due to any combination of the news effect, discipline effect, and the 
overlap of accounting information with private information. The coefficients on res_adv 
in the last three columns are weaker, but remain positive and significant. 
 In Table 24, I revise the baseline model from Table 23 to include conflicts of 
interest measures interacted with the restatement indicator. If there is a discipline effect 
of the restatement announcement, then the probability of an S&P rating downgrade 
concurrent with the announcement will be greater when S&P has greater conflicts of 
interest. As before, I also present results for EJR and compare them to S&P. Panel A 
shows the results for EJR. Consistent with hypothesis H2f, the interaction between 
conflicts of interest and res_adv is not significant in most of the specifications. Panel B 
shows that the results for S&P are generally not significant and are comparable to those 
for EJR. The interaction in the second column is positive and significant, meaning firms 
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with a greater proportion of short-term debt are more likely to be downgraded due to a 
restatement. This is consistent with the discipline effect, but the interaction with financial 
is negative and significant, which is contrary to expectations. Panel C similarly lacks 
evidence to support the discipline effect. The coefficients on the interaction term here 
represent the incremental impact of conflicts of interest on EJR compared to S&P. 
Because EJR should not be affected, these coefficients should be negative. Yet, most are 
insignificant and only one is significantly negative. 
 To explore the mitigating effect of private information overlap on the accounting 
restatement, I re-run the model from Table 24 replacing the conflict of interest measures 
with private information variables. The coefficients on resadv_PI in Panel A of Table 25 
show that private information measures generally do not alter the effect of accounting 
restatements on the probability of an EJR downgrade, consistent with my hypotheses. 
The interactions in Panel B for S&P rating downgrades are also largely insignificant. 
Only the interaction with score_oc4 is significant in the hypothesized direction. With a 
row of almost completely insignificant interaction terms, Panel C shows that there is no 
difference in the private information effects between S&P and EJR, contrary to 
expectations. Overall, the evidence in Table 25 does not support the idea that high quality 
private information reduces the importance of accounting information in determining 
ratings. 
 Although I find limited support for the discipline and private information overlap 
effects of accounting information, I test the conjecture in H2e that firms with more severe 
conflicts of interest and poor or biased private information will be most likely to 
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experience a downgrade from S&P in response to an adverse accounting restatement. To 
test this hypothesis, I include both conflicts of interest and private information in the 
model used in Tables 24 and 25. I fully interact these variables with each other and with 
res_adv. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of all three variables, which should 
be negative when interacting conflicts of interest and res_adv with measures of private 
information quality (i.e. pin and alpha180) and positive when using measures of 
optimism/bias in private information (all other private information measures) in the S&P 
downgrade specification. For downdiff, the coefficients should have the opposite sign, 
and they should all be zero for EJR downgrades. I run the model separately for each 
conflict of interest – private information variable pair, resulting in 56 sets of results for 
each of the dependent variables. As a result, Table 26 presents only the coefficients on 
the key interaction. Consistent with expectations, Panel A shows that the effect is 
generally insignificant for EJR, with the exception of some inconsistently significant 
coefficients on interactions with financial. The coefficients in Panel B that are significant 
are generally the correct sign, but they are not sufficient to support hypothesis H2e. Panel 
C similarly provides little support for hypothesis H2e. Overall, the positive effect of a 
restatement on the probability of a downgrade for both firms appears to be consistent 
with the news effect of accounting information, as the effect does not vary consistently 
with measures of conflicts of interest or private information. 
4. Conclusion 
The extant literature studying the quality of credit ratings focuses on the 
incentives and pressures facing credit rating agencies (Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009; 
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Bonsall, 2013; Opp et al., 2013). This study takes a different perspective and examines 
whether credit rating quality is driven by the quality of the information rating agencies 
use to develop their ratings. I investigate whether credit ratings are better predictors of 
default for rated borrowers with high quality earnings, characterized by timely loss 
recognition and low earnings management. If rating agencies rely on accounting 
information because of its low cost or inadequate alternative information sources, then 
the quality of accounting will determine the timeliness and accuracy of the credit ratings. 
This is what I call the news effect of accounting quality on credit ratings. 
I also consider whether accounting quality may improve rating quality by 
disciplining credit rating agencies that would otherwise issue inflated ratings to cater to 
their clients. Financial statements provide information that is easily observable to 
investors and is relevant for evaluating the credit risk of the issuer. Rating agencies may 
feel compelled to incorporate this information into their ratings to avoid the appearance 
that they are ignoring important information. In this way, accounting information may 
constrain the agencies’ ability to inflate ratings and will, therefore, improve the quality of 
the ratings through the discipline effect. 
I exploit the differences between two rating agencies: EJR, which relies entirely 
on public information in developing its ratings, and S&P, which has access to both public 
and private information. The use of both rating agencies is a significant advantage of this 
study, as EJR operates as a control group for a number of tests. It also enables me to test 
additional hypotheses that contribute to the literature on issuer-paid and investor-paid 
rating agencies. 
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I find that higher earnings quality improves the accuracy and timeliness of credit 
ratings. I also find that both rating agencies are more likely to issue a rating downgrade 
when a firm has an adverse accounting restatement, providing further evidence of rating 
agencies’ reliance on the accuracy of accounting information. This evidence supports the 
news effect of accounting quality. However, when incorporating measures of conflicts of 
interest and private information, I find that the impact of accounting quality does not vary 
predictably with rating agencies’ incentives and ability to inflate ratings. As such, the 
discipline effect of accounting information is not supported by my findings. However, 
this may be due to difficulty in obtaining reliable measures of rating agency conflicts. 
Future researchers may revisit the discipline effect of accounting using superior measures 
of conflicts of interest and private information quality. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable 
Name 
Description 
alpha180 
This is a measure of the profitability of insider trades made over 
the 180 days prior to the start of the quarter. Following Jagolinzer 
et al. (2011), I net all insider transactions on a given day and treat 
them as a single transaction. I then measure profitability as the 
alpha from the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model 
estimated over the 180 days following each transaction. I calculate 
the average alpha of all transactions over the 180 day period, with 
each transaction’s alpha weighted by the number of shares traded 
divided by the total volume of insider trades over the period. The 
measure is an indicator equal to one if the alpha is greater than the 
sample median. 
atq Total assets (in millions) 
ATLR 
Asymmetric timely loss recognition, equal to β3 from the 
specification described in the definition of TLR 
bbb 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s S&P credit rating is 
equal to BBB-, BBB, or BBB+ 
begyrrate The credit rating level one year prior to default 
campscore 
Measure of default risk adopted from Campbell et al. (2008). The 
estimation of this measure is described in section 2.3.1. 
cashmta 
Cash and short-term investments divided by the market value of 
assets. 
cfotl Quarterly operating cash flows divided by total liabilities 
cfotlavg 
The weighted average of quarterly operating cash flows divided 
by total liabilities over the prior 12 months. The weights are such 
that each quarter's ratio has twice the weight of the previous 
quarter. 
clca Current liabilities divided by current assets 
csup 
Indicator equal to one if the default risk (modified Campbell 
failure score) of the firm increases during the quarter. 
dahead 
Number of days prior to default that the agency downgrades the 
firm’s rating, limited to rating downgrades within 360 days of 
default 
defaultX 
Indicator variables equal to 1 in quarter t if the firm will default in 
quarter t + X. 
DiscAcc 
Discretionary accruals equal to the residuals from the modified 
Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) estimated at the 
two-digit SIC and year level. 
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downdiff 
Equal to ejrdown – spdown. 
ejrating Egan-Jones Ratings Company long-term issuer credit rating, 
converted to a numerical scale from 1 to 23. See Table 1, Panel B 
for the mapping from letter to numerical rating. 
ejrdown 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if EJR downgrades the firm in the 
current quarter. 
ejrmsp The difference between the EJR rating and S&P rating, ejrating - 
sprating 
ejrup 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if EJR upgrades the firm in the 
current quarter. 
ewr6 
Indicator equal to one for observations occurring following six 
months of equally-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index 
returns that are greater than the sample median. 
exretavg_sp 
The weighted average of excess returns over the prior twelve 
months. Excess returns are calculated as the monthly raw returns 
minus the return on the S&P 500. The weight on each monthly 
excess return monotonically declines with each monthly lag within 
the 12 month average such that the weight is halved every three 
months. 
financial 
Indicator equal to one for financial firms (three digit SIC code 
between 600 – 641) 
indlevmed 
Indicator is equal to one for firms in an industry where the median 
leverage is greater than the sample median. 
log_rsize 
The natural log of the ratio of the market value of equity to the 
total market value of the S&P 500 
log_size_adj 
The natural log of total assets divided by the consumer price index 
level 
ltd 
Indicator equal to one if the firm’s total long-term debt is greater 
than the sample median. 
ltd_total Total long-term debt, including the current portion (in millions) 
nimtaavg 
The weighted average of net income divided by the market value 
of assets over the prior 12 months. The weights are such that each 
quarter’s ratio has twice the weight of the previous quarter. The 
market value of assets is calculated as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of liabilities. 
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nita Net income divided by the book value of total assets 
option_oc 
To calculate this variable, I first obtain the value of in-the-money 
unexercised exercisable options held by the CEO and scale this 
amount by the CEO’s total holdings. I multiply this ratio by 100 to 
get a percentage. If this amount is greater than the industry-quarter 
median, then this variable is equal to one. Otherwise, it is equal to 
zero. 
pin 
Indicator equal to one if the Probability of Informed Trade (PIN) 
is greater than the sample median. PIN is a measure of information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors in equity 
markets developed by Easley et al. (2002) and modified by Venter 
and de Jongh (2006). 
presox 
Indicator variable equal to one for observations occurring prior to 
2002, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed. 
price 
The stock price of the firm is winsorized at $15 for all values 
above $15. This variable is then calculated as the natural log of the 
winsorized price. 
propstd 
Indicator equal to one if the firm’s ratio of short-term debt to total 
debt is greater than the sample median. 
purch180 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the net insider purchases (volume 
of purchases – volume of sales) divided by shares outstanding 
over the 180 days prior to the start of the quarter were greater than 
zero. 
ratediff 
The difference in the ratings of EJR and S&P at the beginning of 
the period, calculated as the beginning ejrating - sprating. 
ratelevel 
The level of the credit rating for EJR or S&P at the beginning of 
the period. 
res_adv 
Indicator equal to one if the firm announces an adverse accounting 
restatement during the quarter. 
res_fav 
Indicator equal to one if the firm announces a favorable 
accounting restatement during the quarter. 
reverse 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the current rating change for a 
given agency is followed by a change in the opposite direction 
(e.g. a downgrade followed by an upgrade) within 365 days. 
score_oc4 
This is an indicator variable adopted from Schrand and Zechman 
(2012) that captures executive overconfidence. If the sum of the 
following four measures is greater than or equal to three, then this 
variable is equal to one: 
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o Excess investment: the residual from a quarterly cross-
sectional regression of total asset growth on sales growth, 
adjusted for the industry (two-digit SIC) median for that 
quarter. This is set equal to one if it is greater than zero and 
zero otherwise. 
o Excess acquisitions: net acquisitions from the statement of 
cash flows, adjusted for the industry-quarter median. This is 
set equal to one if it is greater than zero and zero otherwise. 
o Excess leverage: the ratio of current and long-term debt to 
the sum of current debt, long-term debt, and the book value 
of shareholders’ equity, adjusted for the industry-quarter 
median. This is set equal to one if it is greater than zero and 
zero otherwise. 
o Risky debt: an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has 
convertible debt or preferred stock greater than zero. 
score_oc5 
This measure of executive overconfidence is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the sum of five measures is greater than or equal to 
three. The first four measures are those described under 
score_oc4, above. The fifth measure is dividend yield, equal to 
zero if the firm paid dividends on common stock over the prior 
twelve months and equal to one if it did not. 
sigma 
The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the prior three 
months 
spdown 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if S&P downgrades the firm in the 
current quarter. 
spmejr The difference between the S&P rating and EJR rating, sprating - 
ejrating 
sprating Standard & Poor's long-term issuer credit rating, converted to a 
numerical scale from 1 to 23. See Table 1, Panel B for the 
mapping from letter to numerical rating. 
spup 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if S&P upgrades the firm in the 
current quarter. 
tang 
Asset tangibility, calculated as net property, plant, and equipment 
divided by total assets 
tenure 
Indicator equal to one if the CEO tenure is greater than the sample 
median. 
tlmta Total liabilities divided by the market value of assets 
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TLR 
I estimate a modified version of the piece-wise linear regression of 
earnings on stock returns from Basu (1997), adding control 
variables suggested by Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2013): 
 
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛄𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net income for the quarter scaled by the market value of 
equity as of the end of the prior quarter. 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator 
equal to one if the market-adjusted stock return in the period is 
negative. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the nominal return for the quarter minus the index 
return. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 include lagged values of the market value of 
equity, market-to-book ratio, leverage and stock price volatility. I 
estimate this model cross-sectionally for each three digit SIC code. 
TLR is the sum of the estimated 𝛽1 and 𝛽3. See Wittenberg-
Moerman (2008) for more details on estimation. 
tlta Total liabilities divided by total assets 
updiff 
Equal to ejrup - spup, so it is 1 if EJR upgrades and S&P doesn't, 
0 if neither upgrades, and -1 if S&P upgrades and EJR doesn't. 
varpay 
The variable portion of CEO compensation is measured as (total 
compensation – fixed salary)/total compensation from 
Execucomp. The variable is an indicator equal to one if this ratio 
is greater than the sample median. 
wrate 
The weighted average rating over the year leading up to default 
for a given agency (EJR or S&P) 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the main sample of firm-quarters that have the data necessary to 
calculate the modified Campbell failure score and ratings from both S&P and EJR. Panel B shows the 
distribution of S&P and EJR ratings for the main sample. Panels C and D provide correlation matrices for 
the measures of conflicts of interest and private information, respectively. Panel E describes the sample of 
firm defaults, with most variables measured as of one year prior to the default date. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Some variables 
that are converted to indicators for use in the empirical analysis are included here in their original form. 
 
Panel A: Firm quarter characteristics – main sample   
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
alpha180 22,349  0.0125 0.1677 -0.0753 0.0042 0.0890 
ATLR 29,649  0.1260 0.0800 0.0946 0.1299 0.1607 
atq 29,647  11778.37 18209.23 2149.10 5052.30 13029.60 
bbb 29,589  0.3629 0.4809 0 0 1 
campscore 29,649  -10.3155 2.5041 -12.1489 -10.5803 -8.8306 
cashmta 29,649  0.0513 0.0579 0.0110 0.0296 0.0691 
cfotlavg 29,649  0.0431 0.0380 0.0192 0.0364 0.0601 
clca 29,649  0.7631 0.3503 0.5018 0.6932 0.9601 
csup 29,405  0.4590 0.4983 0 0 1 
default4 29,649  0.0025 0.0496 0 0 0 
downdiff 28,719  0.0537 0.3298 0 0 0 
DiscAcc 28,471  0.0291 0.1002 -0.0213 0.0171 0.0659 
ejrating 29,649  9.9719 3.5136 7 9 12 
ejrdown 28,757  0.1022 0.3030 0 0 0 
ejrmsp 29,649  0.0171 1.6953 -1 0 1 
ejrup 28,757  0.1006 0.3008 0 0 0 
ewr6 29,649  0.1785 0.4342 -0.1039 0.1517 0.3039 
exretavg_sp 29,649  0.0068 0.0344 -0.0127 0.0067 0.0267 
financial 29,649  0.0186 0.1352 0 0 0 
indlevmed 27,151  0.4332 0.1192 0.3444 0.4218 0.5387 
log_rsize 29,649  -8.0307 1.4294 -8.9221 -7.9678 -6.8976 
ltd 29,356  3287.58 4715.65 611.56 1406.00 3853.05 
nimtaavg 29,649  0.0046 0.0110 0.0023 0.0073 0.0107 
option_oc 24,486  9.3803 23.80 -6.53 2.00 23.93 
pin 25,506  0.1104 0.0586 0.0731 0.1007 0.1373 
presox 29,649  0.1612 0.3677 0 0 0 
price 29,649  2.5388 0.4645 2.7081 2.7081 2.7081 
purch180 22,349  -0.1552 0.3977 -0.1437 -0.0318 -0.0026 
propstd 29,320  0.1227 0.1609 0.0100 0.0623 0.1717 
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Panel A: Firm quarter characteristics – main sample (continued) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
res_adv 29,649  0.0153 0.1228 0 0 0 
res_fav 29,649  0.0034 0.0580 0 0 0 
score_oc4 29,649  0.3687 0.4825 0 0 1 
score_oc5 29,649  0.5048 0.5000 0 1 1 
sigma 29,649  0.3977 0.2188 0.2385 0.3375 0.4877 
spdown 29,589  0.0490 0.2159 0 0 0 
sprating 29,649  9.9548 3.2098 8 10 12 
spup 29,589  0.0276 0.1640 0 0 0 
tang 29,649  0.3628 0.2367 0.1559 0.3156 0.5545 
tenure 24,625  6.1529 6.0927 2 4 8 
tlmta 29,649  0.4709 0.2086 0.3100 0.4528 0.6198 
TLR 29,649  0.1419 0.0688 0.0999 0.1395 0.1766 
updiff 28,719  0.0733 0.3269 0 0 0 
varpay 25,111  0.7798 0.1818 0.7347 0.8374 0.8935 
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Panel B: Distribution of credit ratings 
  Egan-Jones Ratings  S&P Ratings 
Rating Number N % Cum %  N % Cum % 
AAA 1 16 0.05  0.05   160 0.54  0.54  
AA+ 2 86 0.29  0.34   2 0.01  0.55  
AA 3 271 0.91  1.26   368 1.24  1.79  
AA- 4 563 1.90  3.16   420 1.42  3.20  
A+ 5 1,130 3.81  6.97   1,128 3.80  7.01  
A 6 2,407 8.12  15.09   2,475 8.35  15.36  
A- 7 3,080 10.39  25.47   2,337 7.88  23.24  
BBB+ 8 3,622 12.22  37.69   3,035 10.24  33.47  
BBB 9 3,876 13.07  50.76   4,195 14.15  47.62  
BBB- 10 3,031 10.22  60.99   3,541 11.94  59.57  
BB+ 11 2,489 8.39  69.38   2,180 7.35  66.92  
BB 12 2,388 8.05  77.44   2,479 8.36  75.28  
BB- 13 1,872 6.31  83.75   2,716 9.16  84.44  
B+ 14 1,635 5.51  89.26   2,036 6.87  91.31  
B 15 1,212 4.09  93.35   1,431 4.83  96.13  
B- 16 799 2.69  96.05   785 2.65  98.78  
CCC+ 17 117 0.39  96.44   223 0.75  99.53  
CCC 18 473 1.60  98.04   93 0.31  99.85  
CCC- 19 15 0.05  98.09   22 0.07  99.92  
CC 20 338 1.14  99.23   23 0.08  100.00  
C 21 229 0.77  100.00         
Total  29,649 100.00    29,649 100.00   
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Panel C: Correlation of conflict of interest measures 
  bbb propstd presox financial ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
bbb 1.000       
propstd 0.020*** 1.000      
presox -0.022*** 0.073*** 1.000     
financial 0.070*** 0.007 -0.030*** 1.000    
ewr6 0.003 -0.033*** -0.085*** 0.001 1.000   
indlevmed 0.008 -0.039*** 0.112*** -0.131*** 0.010 1.000  
ltd 0.010* 0.067*** -0.064*** -0.025*** 0.002 0.174*** 1.000 
 
 
Panel D: Correlation of private information measures 
  pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
pin 1.000        
tenure -0.002 1.000       
varpay -0.310*** -0.052*** 1.000      
score_oc4 -0.031*** 0.030*** 0.042*** 1.000     
score_oc5 0.069*** 0.037*** 0.000 0.757*** 1.000    
option_oc -0.117*** -0.031*** 0.118*** 0.038*** 0.015** 1.000   
purch180 -0.088*** -0.079*** 0.020*** 0.007 -0.017** -0.050*** 1.000  
alpha180 0.042*** 0.011 -0.029*** 0.013* 0.040*** -0.006 0.081*** 1.000 
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Panel E: Characteristics of defaulting firms 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
ATLR 85  0.1475 0.0998 0.1060 0.1528 0.1866 
cfotl 83  0.0055 0.0429 -0.0098 0.0055 0.0211 
DiscAcc 79  -0.0023 0.1498 -0.0441 0.0017 0.0466 
log_size_adj 85  8.4020 1.2780 7.4653 8.3983 9.4144 
TLR 85  0.1531 0.0804 0.1215 0.1395 0.1896 
tlta 85  0.8006 0.1578 0.7131 0.8282 0.9233 
wrate-S&P 86  14.6136 2.8246 13.5889 15.2444 16.4972 
wrate-EJR 86  16.6498 3.1430 15.2889 16.8292 19.1083 
dahead 392  145.8903 104.8947 49.0000 126.0000 233.5000 
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Table 2 
Incremental Predictive Value of Ratings 
 
This table presents the results from logistic regressions of default indicators for defaults in quarter t+1, t+2,…, t+12 on rating variables (results for some default 
horizons excluded for brevity). Panel A includes the EJR rating and the difference between the S&P rating and the EJR rating to demonstrate the incremental 
information in S&P ratings. Panel B runs the same regressions with the incremental EJR ratings. Both panels include tests on the full sample of firm quarters 
with ratings from both credit rating agencies, and the subsample of firm-quarters for which at least one of the agencies has the firm rated as BB+ or below. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Incremental value of S&P ratings over EJR ratings 
 
Rating Sample 
                  
VARIABLES default1 default2 default3 default4 default6 default8 default10 default12 
                  
ejrating 0.850*** 0.574*** 0.542*** 0.493*** 0.478*** 0.395*** 0.387*** 0.355*** 
 (8.48) (10.20) (10.46) (9.41) (11.10) (9.23) (7.58) (6.07) 
spmejr 0.463*** 0.224** 0.186* 0.216* 0.285*** 0.146** 0.179** 0.183* 
 (3.65) (2.55) (1.82) (1.93) (3.21) (1.97) (2.21) (1.68) 
Constant -18.217*** -13.733*** -13.185*** -12.315*** -12.034*** -11.073*** -11.019*** -10.738*** 
 (-11.05) (-15.44) (-18.04) (-17.12) (-19.01) (-17.61) (-15.47) (-13.93) 
         
Observations 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 
Log Pseudo-
likelihood -279.2 -358.8 -386.7 -414.8 -409.6 -375.1 -348.4 -305.3 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.363 0.245 0.235 0.189 0.159 0.132 0.117 0.0943 
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Panel A (continued) 
 
Speculative Sample 
                  
VARIABLES default1 default2 default3 default4 default6 default8 default10 default12 
                  
ejrating 0.883*** 0.585*** 0.556*** 0.472*** 0.435*** 0.336*** 0.306*** 0.286*** 
 (8.96) (10.40) (9.54) (7.99) (8.40) (5.55) (4.13) (3.27) 
spmejr 0.489*** 0.246*** 0.203** 0.197* 0.242** 0.095 0.112 0.132 
 (4.16) (2.99) (1.99) (1.76) (2.56) (1.14) (1.17) (1.03) 
Constant -18.790*** -13.870*** -13.401*** -11.985*** -11.375*** -10.184*** -9.789*** -9.686*** 
 (-11.32) (-15.24) (-15.41) (-14.16) (-14.69) (-11.23) (-9.35) (-8.06) 
         
Observations 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 
Log Pseudo-
likelihood -267.8 -339.3 -358.8 -386.3 -381.4 -338.9 -319.2 -268.5 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.304 0.175 0.171 0.118 0.0847 0.0659 0.0478 0.0359 
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Panel B: Incremental value of EJR ratings over S&P ratings 
 
Rating Sample 
          
VARIABLES default1 default2 default3 default4 default6 default8 default10 default12 
                  
sprating 0.850*** 0.574*** 0.542*** 0.493*** 0.478*** 0.395*** 0.387*** 0.355*** 
 (8.48) (10.20) (10.46) (9.41) (11.10) (9.23) (7.58) (6.07) 
ejrmsp 0.387*** 0.350*** 0.356*** 0.277*** 0.193*** 0.249*** 0.208*** 0.173*** 
 (5.93) (6.36) (5.50) (3.60) (3.05) (5.62) (4.61) (2.85) 
Constant -18.217*** -13.733*** -13.185*** -12.315*** -12.034*** -11.073*** -11.019*** -10.738*** 
 (-11.05) (-15.44) (-18.04) (-17.12) (-19.01) (-17.61) (-15.47) (-13.93) 
         
Observations 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 29,651 
Log Pseudo-
likelihood -279.2 -358.8 -386.7 -414.8 -409.6 -375.1 -348.4 -305.3 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.363 0.245 0.235 0.189 0.159 0.132 0.117 0.0943 
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Panel B (continued) 
Speculative Sample 
                  
VARIABLES default1 default2 default3 default4 default6 default8 default10 default12 
                  
sprating 0.883*** 0.585*** 0.556*** 0.472*** 0.435*** 0.336*** 0.306*** 0.286*** 
 (8.96) (10.40) (9.54) (7.99) (8.40) (5.55) (4.13) (3.27) 
ejrmsp 0.394*** 0.339*** 0.353*** 0.275*** 0.193*** 0.242*** 0.194*** 0.154*** 
 (5.43) (5.88) (5.07) (3.50) (3.10) (5.60) (4.55) (2.66) 
Constant -18.790*** -13.870*** -13.401*** -11.985*** -11.375*** -10.184*** -9.789*** -9.686*** 
 (-11.32) (-15.24) (-15.41) (-14.16) (-14.69) (-11.23) (-9.35) (-8.06) 
         
Observations 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 
Log Pseudo-
likelihood -267.8 -339.3 -358.8 -386.3 -381.4 -338.9 -319.2 -268.5 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.304 0.175 0.171 0.118 0.0847 0.0659 0.0478 0.0359 
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Table 3 
Default Prediction Accuracy of Models 
 
This table presents the accuracy ratios for four default predictors for defaults at quarter t+1, t+2,…,t+12 (results for some default horizons excluded for brevity). 
The first predictor is the failure score from the modified Campbell model (Campbell et al. 2008), which is the predicted value from a logistic regression of 
defaults at each horizon on a set of market and accounting variables. The second predictor is the EJR credit rating. The third predictor is the S&P credit rating. 
The fourth predictor is the predicted value from a logistic regression of defaults at each horizon on both the S&P rating and the EJR rating. Panel A contains the 
results for the full sample of firm quarters with ratings from both credit rating agencies. Panel B contains the results for the subsample of firm-quarters for which 
at least one of the agencies has the firm rated as BB+ or below. Panel C contains the comparative differences in the accuracy ratios for each pair of predictors for 
the full sample. Panel D contains the differences for the speculative grade sample. Panels C and D show z-statistics in parentheses, calculated using jackknife 
standard errors for nonparametric statistics. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Accuracy ratios for firms rated by both EJR and S&P 
 
 Default prediction horizon (quarters) 
Model 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
Modified Campbell 96.89% 94.49% 91.37% 86.34% 78.19% 73.84% 71.58% 67.43% 
EJR 90.50% 85.20% 83.29% 79.15% 77.20% 73.73% 71.12% 65.21% 
S&P 84.85% 77.63% 78.06% 75.67% 74.71% 68.19% 65.81% 60.41% 
Both ratings 89.64% 84.36% 83.51% 80.16% 77.63% 73.77% 70.85% 64.81% 
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Panel B: Accuracy ratios for speculative grade firms 
 
 Default prediction horizon (quarters) 
Model 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
Modified Campbell 93.87% 89.97% 86.56% 79.42% 65.21% 58.63% 53.74% 50.48% 
EJR 82.74% 73.05% 72.40% 64.25% 59.29% 54.79% 46.16% 38.84% 
S&P 74.66% 61.48% 63.07% 57.83% 54.62% 44.77% 38.85% 33.82% 
Both ratings 81.86% 72.43% 73.55% 66.53% 60.23% 55.28% 46.26% 40.80% 
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Panel C: Comparison of accuracy ratios across models for all rated firms 
  
Model differences 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
Mod Campbell – EJR 6.39%*** 9.28%*** 8.07%*** 7.19%** 0.99% 0.11% 0.46% 2.22% 
 (3.18) (4.16) (3.25) (2.43) (0.30) (0.03) (0.11) (0.39) 
Mod Campbell - S&P 12.04%*** 16.86%*** 13.31%*** 10.67%*** 3.48% 5.65% 5.77% 7.01% 
 (3.26) (4.42) (3.95) (2.93) (0.87) (1.16) (1.01) (1.01) 
Mod Campbell - Both ratings 7.25%*** 10.12%*** 7.86%*** 6.18%** 0.56% 0.07% 0.72% 2.61% 
 (2.63) (3.76) (2.95) (2.04) (0.16) (0.02) (0.15) (0.42) 
EJR - S&P 5.65%** 7.57%*** 5.24%** 3.48% 2.49% 5.54%** 5.31%* 4.80% 
 (2.37) (3.11) (2.43) (1.43) (1.12) (1.98) (1.92) (1.47) 
EJR - Both ratings 0.86% 0.84% -0.21% -1.01% -0.43% -0.04% 0.26% 0.40% 
 (0.78) (1.03) (-0.3) (-1.08) (-0.36) (-0.04) (0.25) (0.24) 
S&P - Both ratings -4.79%*** -6.73%*** -5.45%*** -4.49%*** -2.92%*** -5.58%*** -5.04%*** -4.40%** 
  (-3.46) (-4.00) (-3.56) (-2.83) (-2.74) (-2.83) (-2.86) (-2.48) 
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Panel D: Comparison of accuracy ratios across models for speculative-grade firms 
  
Model differences 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
Mod Campbell – EJR 11.13%*** 16.92%*** 14.16%*** 15.18%*** 5.92% 3.85% 7.58% 11.63% 
 (3.53) (4.09) (3.48) (3.56) (1.28) (0.74) (1.35) (1.35) 
Mod Campbell - S&P 19.22%*** 28.49%*** 23.49%*** 21.60%*** 10.60%* 13.86%* 14.89%* 16.65%* 
 (3.5) (4.75) (4.48) (3.98) (1.68) (1.87) (1.88) (1.66) 
Mod Campbell - Both ratings 12.01%*** 17.54%*** 13.01%*** 12.90%*** 4.98% 3.36% 7.48% 9.68% 
 (2.62) (3.73) (3.09) (3.05) (0.94) (0.61) (1.19) (1.09) 
EJR - S&P 8.09%** 11.57%*** 9.33%** 6.42% 4.67% 10.01%* 7.31% 5.02% 
 (2.07) (2.85) (2.25) (1.29) (1.06) (1.75) (1.46) (0.73) 
EJR - Both ratings 0.88% 0.62% -1.14% -2.28% -0.94% -0.49% -0.10% -1.95% 
 (0.39) (0.38) (-0.88) (-1.17) (-0.38) (-0.36) (-0.06) (-0.72) 
S&P - Both ratings -7.21%*** -10.95%*** -10.47%*** -8.70%*** -5.62%*** -10.50%** -7.41%** -6.97% 
  (-3.26) (-4.08) (-3.36) (-2.62) (-2.62) (-2.28) (-2.15) (-1.49) 
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Table 4 
Accounting Quality and Rating Accuracy 
 
This table presents the accuracy ratios for Egan-Jones ratings and S&P ratings for the prediction of default at quarter t+1, t+2,…,t+12 (results for some default 
horizons excluded for brevity). The sample is partitioned at the median using three different accounting quality variables: TLR, ATLR, and DiscAcc, as defined 
in Appendix A, except that this analysis uses abs(DiscAcc) rather than the signed magnitude. Panel A shows the difference in the accuracy ratios for EJR ratings 
across the subsamples for each of the three accounting quality variables. Panel B shows comparable results for S&P ratings. Panel C displays the differences 
between the EJR and S&P accuracy ratios for each accounting quality subsample and default prediction horizon. 
 
 
Panel A: Egan-Jones Ratings 
  Accuracy Ratio by Default Horizon 
 N 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
High TLR 18,422 0.882 0.824 0.798 0.774 0.734 0.714 0.674 0.584 
Low TLR 19,100 0.888 0.842 0.790 0.738 0.700 0.674 0.606 0.590 
Difference  -0.006 -0.018 0.008 0.036 0.034 0.04 0.068 -0.006 
   
High ATLR 18,148 0.858 0.786 0.776 0.732 0.686 0.65 0.614 0.586 
Low ATLR 19,374 0.922 0.894 0.808 0.776 0.748 0.758 0.67 0.588 
Difference  -0.064 -0.108 -0.032 -0.044 -0.062 -0.108 -0.056 -0.002 
          
Low Disc Acc 16,672 0.94 0.876 0.826 0.79 0.728 0.658 0.576 0.598 
High Disc Acc 16,677 0.842 0.784 0.74 0.684 0.674 0.72 0.648 0.548 
Difference  0.098 0.092 0.086 0.106 0.054 -0.062 -0.072 0.05 
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Panel B: Standard and Poor’s 
  Accuracy Ratio by Default Horizon 
 N 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
High TLR 18,422 0.830 0.742 0.734 0.718 0.688 0.626 0.576 0.456 
Low TLR 19,100 0.788 0.750 0.748 0.716 0.704 0.644 0.572 0.586 
Difference  0.042 -0.008 -0.014 0.002 -0.016 -0.018 0.004 -0.13 
   
High ATLR 18,148 0.802 0.734 0.746 0.718 0.7 0.614 0.542 0.498 
Low ATLR 19,374 0.812 0.752 0.712 0.694 0.66 0.654 0.612 0.538 
Difference  -0.01 -0.018 0.034 0.024 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 
          
Low Disc Acc 16,672 0.74 0.756 0.764 0.754 0.716 0.63 0.536 0.528 
High Disc Acc 16,677 0.816 0.702 0.68 0.63 0.652 0.626 0.598 0.498 
Difference  -0.076 0.054 0.084 0.124 0.064 0.004 -0.062 0.03 
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Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P 
 
  
  Difference in Accuracy Ratio by Default Horizon 
 N 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 
High TLR 18,422 0.052 0.082 0.064 0.056 0.046 0.088 0.098 0.128 
Low TLR 19,100 0.100 0.092 0.042 0.022 -0.004 0.030 0.034 0.004 
Difference  -0.048 -0.01 0.022 0.034 0.05 0.058 0.064 0.124 
          
   
High ATLR 18,148 0.056 0.052 0.03 0.014 -0.014 0.036 0.072 0.088 
Low ATLR 19,374 0.11 0.142 0.096 0.082 0.088 0.104 0.058 0.05 
Difference  -0.054 -0.09 -0.066 -0.068 -0.102 -0.068 0.014 0.038 
          
Low Disc Acc 16,672 0.2 0.12 0.062 0.036 0.012 0.028 0.04 0.07 
High Disc Acc 16,677 0.026 0.082 0.06 0.054 0.022 0.094 0.05 0.05 
Difference  0.174 0.038 0.002 -0.018 -0.01 -0.066 -0.01 0.02 
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Table 5 
Modified Campbell Score Variable Weights 
 
This table presents the weights for the modified Campbell failure score estimated from 1990-2012. The 
weights are coefficients from the logistic regression of an indicator variable equal to 1 for default in quarter 
t+1 on a set of market and accounting variables (Campbell et al. 2008). The weights vary by year, as the 
failure score is estimated annually using expanding windows starting in 1990 to allow out-of-sample 
prediction. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Variable Weight 
log_rsize 0.072 
 (0.89) 
tlmta 9.337*** 
 (10.30) 
clca 0.328** 
 (2.18) 
nimtaavg -18.686*** 
 (-3.95) 
cfotlavg -11.349*** 
 (-5.98) 
exretavg_sp -7.814*** 
 (-5.09) 
sigma 2.873*** 
 (6.36) 
cashmta -4.152*** 
 (-3.90) 
tang 0.560** 
 (2.17) 
price -0.367*** 
 (-5.49) 
Constant -14.503*** 
 (-12.72) 
  
Observations 128,742 
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Table 6 
Accounting Quality and Default Risk Prediction 
 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and 
EJR credit ratings interacted with three accounting quality variables: TLR, ATLR, and DiscAcc. Panel A 
includes the results for EJR ratings; Panel B for S&P ratings; and Panel C for the incremental effect of S&P 
ratings over EJR ratings. All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and 
are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: EJR ratings 
          
  AQ = 
VARIABLES Overall TLR ATLR DiscAcc 
          
ejrating 0.4363*** 0.4187*** 0.4157*** 0.4636*** 
 (26.39) (15.26) (17.14) (31.16) 
spmejr -0.1575***    
 (-4.67)    
AQ  -3.3353** -4.6885*** 1.0280 
  (-2.25) (-3.35) (1.37) 
AQ_EJR  0.2540* 0.3125** -0.0717 
  (1.92) (2.51) (-1.13) 
Constant -14.6674*** -13.6283*** -13.5099*** -14.2201*** 
 (-94.09) (-44.42) (-49.64) (-82.55) 
     
Observations 29,649 29,649 29,649 28,471 
R-squared 0.430 0.465 0.468 0.471 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P ratings  
          
  AQ = 
VARIABLES Overall TLR ATLR DiscAcc 
          
sprating 0.4363*** 0.3459*** 0.3541*** 0.4285*** 
 (26.39) (10.33) (12.00) (22.00) 
ejrmsp 0.5938***    
 (19.72)    
AQ  -4.6254** -5.5587*** 1.3600 
  (-2.38) (-2.98) (1.34) 
AQ_SP  0.5041*** 0.4966*** -0.1339 
  (2.66) (2.76) (-1.48) 
Constant -14.6674*** -12.9681*** -12.9167*** -13.7669*** 
 (-94.09) (-36.54) (-41.05) (-66.39) 
     
Observations 29,649 29,649 29,649 28,471 
R-squared 0.430 0.353 0.354 0.356 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel C: Incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
        
 AQ = 
VARIABLES TLR ATLR DiscAcc 
        
ejrating 0.4009*** 0.3987*** 0.4422*** 
 (13.56) (15.36) (25.86) 
spmejr -0.1263* -0.1110* -0.1103*** 
 (-1.89) (-1.82) (-3.46) 
AQ -3.5054** -4.7467*** 0.5467 
 (-2.15) (-3.00) (0.61) 
AQ_EJR 0.2612* 0.3104** -0.0292 
 (1.70) (2.11) (-0.36) 
AQ_spmejr 0.2212 0.1184 0.0825 
 (0.64) (0.35) (0.50) 
Constant -13.4611*** -13.3567*** -14.0343*** 
 (-41.72) (-46.66) (-74.50) 
    
Observations 29,649 29,649 28,471 
R-squared 0.468 0.471 0.475 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 7 
Rating Change Reversals 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models with reverse as the dependent variable. 
Reverse is an indicator equal to one if the rating change is followed by a rating change in the opposite 
direction (e.g. a downgrade followed by an upgrade) within 365 days. The sample includes all rating 
downgrades for both EJR and S&P in columns labeled “Down,” and all upgrades in columns labeled “Up.” 
EJRdum is an indicator variable equal to one if the rating change is from EJR and zero if it is S&P. AQ 
represents the accounting quality variables – ATLR or DiscAcc. All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm 
and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
   AQ = ATLR AQ = DiscAcc 
VARIABLES Down Up Down Up Down Up 
              
EJRdum 0.136*** 0.111*** 0.195*** 0.140*** 0.152*** 0.146*** 
 (8.74) (8.82) (12.45) (7.60) (9.46) (9.00) 
AQ   0.148*** 0.085 -0.028 0.006 
   (3.41) (1.08) (-0.60) (0.10) 
EJRDUM_AQ   -0.285*** 0.019 0.028 -0.071 
   (-4.25) (0.20) (0.36) (-0.80) 
Ratelevel   0.004*** -0.004** 0.004*** -0.004** 
   (3.18) (-2.17) (2.83) (-2.53) 
Constant 0.028*** 0.045*** 0.022 0.183*** 0.034 0.195*** 
 (6.49) (5.47) (0.75) (3.99) (1.19) (6.36) 
       
Observations 6,886 4,926 6,368 4,600 5,710 4,182 
R-squared 0.039 0.018 0.097 0.072 0.094 0.072 
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 8 
Accounting Quality and Rating Responses to Default Risk Changes 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for six dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, 
ejrup, spup, downdiff, and updiff, all defined in Appendix A. One of the key independent variables is the 
change in the modified Campbell failure score during the quarter. The change is represented by the 
indicator variable csup, which equals one when the failure score increases during the quarter. AQ represents 
the accounting quality variable: TLR in Panel A, ATLR, in Panel B, and DiscAcc in Panel C, all of which 
are defined in Appendix A. All other variables are also defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effects of timely loss recognition (TLR) 
VARIABLES ejrdown ejrup spdown spup downdiff updiff 
              
AQ 0.090** 0.029 0.022 0.033 0.093** -0.014 
 (2.24) (0.62) (0.96) (1.47) (2.52) (-0.29) 
campscore_lag 0.029*** -0.024*** 0.022*** -0.009*** 0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (11.17) (-12.10) (12.77) (-12.23) (5.54) (-6.37) 
csup 0.049*** -0.045*** 0.014** -0.005 0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (4.25) (-5.30) (2.12) (-1.09) (3.42) (-3.90) 
AQ_csup 0.174** 0.027 0.114*** -0.041 0.066 0.057 
 (2.46) (0.61) (2.80) (-1.35) (1.08) (1.07) 
ejrating_lag -0.010*** 0.020***     
 (-7.58) (12.75)     
sprating_lag   -0.007*** 0.009***   
   (-8.56) (13.54)   
ejrmsp_lag     -0.024*** 0.031*** 
     (-10.82) (8.49) 
Constant 0.446*** -0.359*** 0.339*** -0.143*** 0.074*** -0.042** 
 (13.20) (-10.17) (15.13) (-10.87) (4.96) (-2.24) 
       
Observations 28,528 28,528 29,349 29,349 28,492 28,492 
R-squared 0.061 0.065 0.051 0.027 0.029 0.044 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
 
  
93 
 
Panel B: Effects of asymmetric timely loss recognition (ATLR) 
 
VARIABLES ejrdown ejrup spdown spup downdiff updiff 
              
AQ 0.110*** 0.028 0.034 0.034* 0.093*** 0.000 
 (3.00) (0.63) (1.59) (1.91) (2.76) (0.00) 
campscore_lag 0.029*** -0.024*** 0.022*** -0.009*** 0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (11.29) (-12.14) (12.81) (-12.26) (5.60) (-6.41) 
csup 0.056*** -0.041*** 0.017*** -0.005 0.039*** -0.030*** 
 (5.40) (-5.32) (3.09) (-1.51) (4.03) (-3.70) 
AQ_csup 0.139** -0.002 0.105*** -0.042 0.038 0.026 
 (2.23) (-0.04) (2.78) (-1.58) (0.66) (0.48) 
ejrating_lag -0.010*** 0.020***     
 (-7.77) (12.75)     
sprating_lag   -0.007*** 0.009***   
   (-8.63) (13.55)   
ejrmsp_lag     -0.024*** 0.031*** 
     (-10.85) (8.49) 
Constant 0.451*** -0.358*** 0.340*** -0.142*** 0.076*** -0.044** 
 (13.58) (-10.47) (15.38) (-11.15) (5.52) (-2.49) 
       
Observations 28,528 28,528 29,349 29,349 28,492 28,492 
R-squared 0.061 0.065 0.051 0.027 0.029 0.044 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel C: Effects of discretionary accruals 
 
VARIABLES ejrdown ejrup spdown spup downdiff updiff 
              
AQ 0.008 -0.008 0.027 -0.006 -0.017 -0.022 
 (0.39) (-0.29) (1.47) (-0.39) (-0.80) (-0.69) 
campscore_lag 0.029*** -0.024*** 0.022*** -0.009*** 0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (11.22) (-11.99) (12.82) (-12.33) (5.72) (-6.36) 
csup 0.078*** -0.043*** 0.034*** -0.012*** 0.044*** -0.027*** 
 (9.38) (-7.97) (6.88) (-6.23) (8.10) (-4.94) 
AQ_csup -0.090** 0.062* -0.130*** 0.044* 0.045 0.011 
 (-2.21) (1.77) (-3.42) (1.93) (0.99) (0.27) 
ejrating_lag -0.010*** 0.021***     
 (-7.44) (12.79)     
sprating_lag   -0.007*** 0.009***   
   (-8.50) (13.23)   
ejrmsp_lag     -0.025*** 0.033*** 
     (-10.67) (8.60) 
Constant 0.465*** -0.361*** 0.344*** -0.136*** 0.091*** -0.046*** 
 (13.79) (-10.68) (15.37) (-11.04) (6.63) (-3.03) 
       
Observations 27,403 27,403 28,190 28,190 27,368 27,368 
R-squared 0.061 0.066 0.052 0.027 0.029 0.045 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 9 
Accounting Quality and Default Risk Prediction, 
Controlling for Conflicts of Interest 
 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and 
EJR credit ratings interacted with three accounting quality variables: TLR, ATLR, and DiscAcc. The model 
is the same as that presented in Table 6, with two control variables added: a conflict of interest (CI) 
indicator and the CI indicator interacted with the credit rating. The CI variables are defined in the text and 
in Appendix A. The purpose of this table is to examine whether the effect of accounting quality on the 
credit ratings persists after controlling for conflicts of interest. For brevity, only the coefficients on the 
interaction of accounting quality and credit ratings are shown. Panel A includes the results for EJR ratings; 
Panel B for S&P ratings; and Panel C for the incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings. t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Egan-Jones Ratings 
 Conflicts of Interest = 
VARIABLES financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
              
EJR_TLR 0.2535* 0.2013 0.2509* 0.2483* 0.2708* 0.1623 
 (1.91) (1.54) (1.87) (1.86) (1.87) (1.32) 
EJR_ATLR 0.3068** 0.2763** 0.3098** 0.3067** 0.3074** 0.2300** 
 (2.46) (2.27) (2.46) (2.45) (2.39) (2.00) 
EJR_DiscAcc -0.0723 -0.0238 -0.0444 -0.0653 -0.0474 -0.0275 
 (-1.14) (-0.39) (-0.66) (-1.04) (-0.76) (-0.44) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: Standard & Poor’s 
 
 Conflicts of interest = 
VARIABLES financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
              
SP_TLR 0.5062*** 0.4404** 0.5036*** 0.5003*** 0.5253*** 0.4470** 
 (2.68) (2.43) (2.66) (2.64) (2.65) (2.54) 
SP_ATLR 0.4849*** 0.4476*** 0.5126*** 0.4920*** 0.4467*** 0.4223** 
 (2.70) (2.62) (2.85) (2.73) (2.63) (2.45) 
SP_DiscAcc -0.1312 -0.0703 -0.1233 -0.1282 -0.0769 -0.0832 
 (-1.46) (-0.82) (-1.33) (-1.45) (-0.87) (-0.94) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: S&P ratings minus EJR ratings 
 
 Conflicts of interest = 
VARIABLES financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
              
spmejr_TLR 0.2313 0.1318 0.2247 0.2238 0.4695 0.3116 
 (0.68) (0.40) (0.64) (0.65) (1.47) (1.00) 
spmejr_ATLR 0.1052 0.0400 0.1552 0.1185 0.1904 0.1173 
 (0.31) (0.12) (0.45) (0.35) (0.66) (0.39) 
spmejr_DiscAcc 0.0752 0.1190 0.0491 0.0798 0.1303 0.1160 
 (0.45) (0.74) (0.28) (0.48) (0.79) (0.72) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 10 
Accounting Quality and Default Risk Prediction, 
Controlling for Private Information Quality 
 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and EJR credit ratings interacted with three accounting 
quality variables: TLR, ATLR, and DiscAcc. The model is the same as that presented in Table 6, with two control variables added: a private information quality 
(PI) indicator and the PI indicator interacted with the credit rating. The PI variables are defined in the text and in Appendix A. The purpose of this table is to 
examine whether the effect of accounting quality on the credit ratings persists after controlling for private information quality. For brevity, only the coefficients 
on the interaction of accounting quality and credit ratings are shown. Panel A includes the results for EJR ratings; Panel B for S&P ratings; and Panel C for the 
incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Egan-Jones Ratings 
 
 Private Information Quality = 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
EJR_TLR 0.2594** 0.1592 0.1668 0.2446* 0.2618** 0.1469 0.1581 0.1494 
 (1.99) (1.10) (1.15) (1.85) (1.98) (1.04) (1.12) (1.05) 
EJR_ATLR 0.3082** 0.2045 0.2051 0.3107** 0.3092** 0.1774 0.2483* 0.2351* 
 (2.54) (1.55) (1.57) (2.49) (2.50) (1.39) (1.91) (1.76) 
EJR_DiscAcc -0.0566 -0.0471 -0.0690 -0.0681 -0.0698 -0.0568 -0.0887 -0.0953 
 (-0.90) (-0.66) (-0.97) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-0.82) (-1.38) (-1.41) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Panel B: Standard and Poor’s 
 Private Information Quality = 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
SP_TLR 0.4819*** 0.4492** 0.4416** 0.4846** 0.5308*** 0.4091** 0.3188* 0.3127 
 (2.68) (2.09) (2.09) (2.56) (2.83) (1.99) (1.69) (1.63) 
SP_ATLR 0.4779*** 0.4629** 0.4416** 0.4896*** 0.4993*** 0.4146** 0.3873** 0.3646* 
 (2.85) (2.26) (2.23) (2.72) (2.81) (2.12) (2.20) (1.96) 
SP_DiscAcc -0.1076 -0.0518 -0.0961 -0.1248 -0.1372 -0.0472 -0.1680* -0.1873** 
 (-1.26) (-0.51) (-0.92) (-1.40) (-1.55) (-0.46) (-1.90) (-1.99) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
 
Panel C: S&P ratings minus EJR ratings 
 Private Information Quality = 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
spmejr_TLR 0.0808 0.3116 0.3438 0.2118 0.2520 0.3321 -0.0069 0.0036 
 (0.24) (0.97) (1.13) (0.62) (0.73) (1.04) (-0.02) (0.01) 
spmejr_ATLR -0.0052 0.2430 0.2468 0.1118 0.1244 0.2855 0.0463 0.0478 
 (-0.02) (0.80) (0.86) (0.33) (0.37) (0.97) (0.15) (0.15) 
spmejr_DiscAcc 0.0677 0.3268* 0.3079* 0.0908 0.0775 0.3801** 0.0972 0.0828 
 (0.40) (1.76) (1.65) (0.54) (0.47) (1.99) (0.54) (0.46) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Table 11 
Accounting Quality and Rating Responses to Default Risk Changes, 
Controlling for Conflicts of Interest 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. One of 
the key independent variables is the change in the modified Campbell failure score during the quarter. The change is represented by the indicator variable csup, 
which equals one when the failure score increases during the quarter. The model is the same as that presented in Table 8, with two control variables added: a 
conflict of interest (CI) indicator and the CI indicator interacted with csup. For brevity, only the coefficients on the interaction of accounting quality and csup are 
shown, and results for upgrades are excluded. Panel A includes the results for EJR downgrades; Panel B for S&P downgrades; and Panel C for the difference, 
downdiff. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: EJR Downgrades 
 
 Conflicts of Interest = 
VARIABLES bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
TLR_csup 0.163** 0.165** 0.166** 0.163** 0.161** 0.167** 0.172*** 
 (2.53) (2.54) (2.53) (2.47) (2.49) (2.42) (2.62) 
ATLR_csup 0.135** 0.135** 0.134** 0.134** 0.133** 0.133** 0.141** 
 (2.30) (2.29) (2.26) (2.23) (2.26) (2.12) (2.39) 
DiscAcc_csup -0.090** -0.092** -0.096** -0.087** -0.087** -0.063 -0.096** 
 (-2.36) (-2.40) (-2.47) (-2.13) (-2.29) (-1.60) (-2.50) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
 Conflicts of Interest = 
VARIABLES bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
TLR_csup 0.096** 0.099** 0.105*** 0.097** 0.098** 0.106** 0.099** 
 (2.45) (2.52) (2.63) (2.49) (2.51) (2.55) (2.51) 
ATLR_csup 0.093** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.095** 0.097*** 0.092** 0.093** 
 (2.54) (2.63) (2.58) (2.56) (2.63) (2.57) (2.51) 
DiscAcc_csup -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.087*** -0.102*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.47) (-3.46) (-3.23) (-3.43) (-3.08) (-3.44) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
 
Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
 Conflicts of Interest = 
VARIABLES bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
TLR_csup 0.073 0.072 0.069 0.071 0.069 0.064 0.080 
 (1.31) (1.29) (1.22) (1.29) (1.22) (1.05) (1.43) 
ATLR_csup 0.046 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.042 0.052 
 (0.85) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.75) (0.71) (0.98) 
DiscAcc_csup 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.029 0.008 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.26) (0.39) (0.45) (0.72) (0.20) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 12 
Accounting Quality and Rating Responses to Default Risk Changes, 
Controlling for Private Information Quality 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. One of 
the key independent variables is the change in the modified Campbell failure score during the quarter. The change is represented by the indicator variable csup, 
which equals one when the failure score increases during the quarter. The model is the same as that presented in Table 8, with two control variables added: a 
private information quality (PI) indicator and the PI indicator interacted with csup. For brevity, only the coefficients on the interaction of accounting quality and 
csup are shown, and results for upgrades are excluded. Panel A includes the results for EJR downgrades; Panel B for S&P downgrades; and Panel C for the 
difference, downdiff. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: EJR Downgrades 
 Private Information Quality =  
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
TLR_csup 0.142* 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.165** 0.166** 0.175*** 0.162** 0.175** 
 (1.96) (2.86) (2.85) (2.54) (2.55) (2.82) (2.39) (2.49) 
ATLR_csup 0.125* 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.135** 0.132** 0.147*** 0.126** 0.132** 
 (1.80) (2.68) (2.69) (2.28) (2.24) (2.60) (2.04) (2.09) 
DiscAcc_csup -0.065 -0.103** -0.108*** -0.091** -0.089** -0.088** -0.090** -0.098** 
 (-1.61) (-2.53) (-2.64) (-2.39) (-2.34) (-2.17) (-2.20) (-2.31) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
 Private Information Quality =  
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
TLR_csup 0.087** 0.098** 0.088** 0.097** 0.099** 0.101** 0.099*** 0.109*** 
 (2.25) (2.39) (2.24) (2.47) (2.51) (2.54) (2.83) (2.95) 
ATLR_csup 0.084** 0.088** 0.086** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.084** 0.090*** 0.096*** 
 (2.33) (2.31) (2.27) (2.64) (2.62) (2.31) (2.73) (2.81) 
DiscAcc_csup -0.102*** -0.088*** -0.099*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.090** -0.125*** -0.130*** 
 (-3.33) (-2.68) (-2.83) (-3.46) (-3.45) (-2.41) (-4.16) (-4.20) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
 
Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
 Private Information Quality = 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
TLR_csup 0.065 0.088 0.097* 0.075 0.073 0.079 0.068 0.071 
 (1.01) (1.59) (1.76) (1.32) (1.29) (1.46) (1.07) (1.11) 
ATLR_csup 0.049 0.071 0.073 0.042 0.040 0.065 0.042 0.043 
 (0.80) (1.39) (1.43) (0.77) (0.74) (1.29) (0.69) (0.70) 
DiscAcc_csup 0.041 -0.010 -0.003 0.015 0.017 0.008 0.040 0.037 
 (0.94) (-0.24) (-0.08) (0.39) (0.44) (0.16) (1.04) (0.96) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Table 13 
Direct Effect of Conflicts of Interest on Rating Accuracy 
 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and EJR credit ratings interacted with measures of conflicts 
of interest (CI). The measures are defined in the text and Appendix A. Panel A includes the results for EJR ratings; Panel B for S&P ratings; and Panel C for the 
incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Egan-Jones Ratings 
 
VARIABLES financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
              
ejrating 0.4569*** 0.5074*** 0.4530*** 0.4912*** 0.4303*** 0.5108*** 
 (30.98) (32.84) (26.90) (30.49) (21.86) (27.92) 
CI 2.8802** 1.2082*** -0.0495 0.3594*** 0.8473*** 1.6937*** 
 (2.13) (7.07) (-0.24) (2.79) (3.34) (7.59) 
CI_EJR -0.3966*** -0.0544*** 0.0747*** -0.0714*** 0.0209 -0.0317 
 (-2.75) (-3.43) (3.59) (-4.57) (0.89) (-1.55) 
Constant -14.1137*** -14.9613*** -14.9459*** -14.1331*** -14.6286*** -15.2497*** 
 (-86.21) (-85.30) (-98.40) (-79.44) (-72.70) (-75.21) 
       
Observations 29,651 29,322 29,651 29,651 27,152 29,356 
R-squared 0.466 0.484 0.432 0.470 0.503 0.536 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Ratings 
 
VARIABLES financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
              
sprating 0.4230*** 0.5028*** 0.4025*** 0.4610*** 0.3745*** 0.5064*** 
 (22.15) (24.24) (19.63) (22.39) (15.54) (19.09) 
CI 4.4126*** 1.6346*** 0.1648 0.4318*** 0.7033** 1.9645*** 
 (3.66) (7.04) (0.61) (2.70) (2.24) (6.42) 
CI_SP -0.5730*** -0.0878*** 0.0817*** -0.0810*** 0.0550* -0.0418 
 (-4.74) (-3.75) (3.03) (-4.72) (1.84) (-1.45) 
Constant -13.6587*** -14.8530*** -14.4744*** -13.7089*** -14.1160*** -15.1417*** 
 (-68.96) (-66.89) (-71.67) (-65.13) (-58.50) (-53.51) 
       
Observations 29,651 29,322 29,651 29,651 27,152 29,356 
R-squared 0.357 0.376 0.294 0.358 0.403 0.438 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel C: Incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings 
 
VARIABLES financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
              
ejrating 0.4406*** 0.5061*** 0.4258*** 0.4755*** 0.4111*** 0.5082*** 
 (26.37) (27.53) (23.32) (26.59) (19.11) (22.17) 
CI 3.4950*** 1.3284*** -0.1072 0.3892*** 0.7586*** 1.6393*** 
 (2.58) (6.54) (-0.49) (2.95) (2.72) (5.97) 
CI_EJR -0.4461*** -0.0694*** 0.0712*** -0.0740*** 0.0273 -0.0260 
 (-3.15) (-3.48) (3.33) (-4.93) (1.03) (-1.02) 
spmejr -0.0870*** -0.0077 -0.1339*** -0.0813** -0.1133*** -0.0101 
 (-2.65) (-0.21) (-3.57) (-2.49) (-2.91) (-0.22) 
CI_spmejr -0.3320*** -0.0787** -0.0437 -0.0191 0.0405 0.0275 
 (-3.10) (-2.04) (-0.76) (-0.65) (0.84) (0.54) 
Constant -13.9740*** -14.9636*** -14.6655*** -14.0079*** -14.4415*** -15.2206*** 
 (-79.17) (-75.08) (-84.61) (-74.48) (-66.75) (-61.44) 
       
Observations 29,651 29,322 29,651 29,651 27,152 29,356 
R-squared 0.470 0.485 0.440 0.473 0.507 0.536 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 14 
Direct Effect of Conflicts of Interest on Rating Timeliness 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. One of 
the key independent variables is the change in the modified Campbell failure score during the quarter. The change is represented by the indicator variable csup, 
which equals one when the failure score increases during the quarter. CI represents the conflict of interest variable. CI_csup is the interaction of these terms. All 
other variables are also defined in Appendix A. Panel A includes the results for EJR downgrades; Panel B for S&P downgrades; and Panel C for the difference, 
downdiff. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: EJR Downgrades 
VARIABLES bbb financial propstd presox ewr indlevmed ltd 
                
csup 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.084*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 
 (8.50) (8.94) (10.19) (7.16) (7.81) (7.62) (9.48) 
CI -0.006 0.022 0.004 0.001 -0.014 -0.038*** -0.013** 
 (-1.31) (1.12) (0.64) (0.05) (-1.09) (-5.57) (-2.08) 
CI_csup -0.005 -0.025 -0.000 0.050*** -0.026** 0.013 0.012 
 (-0.60) (-0.73) (-0.04) (3.18) (-2.17) (1.22) (1.62) 
campscore_lag 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 
 (11.10) (11.07) (11.12) (8.55) (11.45) (10.89) (10.78) 
ejrating_lag -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-7.81) (-7.37) (-7.19) (-6.72) (-7.63) (-7.60) (-7.06) 
Constant 0.460*** 0.454*** 0.454*** 0.462*** 0.474*** 0.504*** 0.475*** 
 (14.06) (13.70) (13.45) (9.04) (12.69) (12.87) (12.48) 
        
Observations 28,492 28,528 28,218 28,528 28,528 26,100 28,249 
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.048 0.061 0.062 0.059 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
VARIABLES bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
csup 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 
 (6.74) (6.80) (6.82) (6.20) (6.22) (4.99) (7.52) 
CI 0.000 0.014 0.003 -0.010 0.009** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.01) (1.04) (1.14) (-1.57) (2.28) (-4.74) (-6.08) 
CI_csup -0.019*** -0.006 -0.009* 0.024*** -0.015** 0.008 -0.007 
 (-3.73) (-0.47) (-1.74) (3.06) (-2.25) (1.11) (-1.30) 
campscore_lag 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (12.74) (12.75) (12.83) (12.94) (12.81) (12.30) (13.36) 
sprating_lag -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (-8.58) (-8.44) (-8.34) (-8.54) (-8.49) (-8.51) (-10.20) 
Constant 0.344*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.327*** 0.338*** 0.378*** 0.395*** 
 (15.53) (15.49) (15.67) (13.92) (15.03) (14.80) (15.87) 
        
Observations 29,349 29,349 29,026 29,349 29,349 26,878 29,059 
R-squared 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.054 0.053 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
VARIABLES bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
csup 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
 (6.86) (7.73) (7.56) (5.01) (5.20) (5.99) (6.70) 
CI -0.004 0.004 0.008* 0.017 -0.024** -0.011** 0.018*** 
 (-0.89) (0.16) (1.78) (1.21) (-2.24) (-2.05) (3.11) 
CI_csup 0.011 -0.019 0.009 0.026 -0.009 0.009 0.019** 
 (1.40) (-0.74) (0.98) (1.52) (-0.85) (0.94) (2.04) 
campscore_lag 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (5.54) (5.56) (5.65) (4.87) (5.33) (5.78) (5.02) 
ejrmsp_lag -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (-10.61) (-10.61) (-10.76) (-11.15) (-10.41) (-10.64) (-11.07) 
Constant 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.075*** 
 (6.59) (6.50) (6.26) (5.48) (7.22) (6.27) (5.51) 
        
Observations 28,492 28,492 28,184 28,492 28,492 26,068 28,214 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.030 0.030 0.031 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 15 
Direct Effect of Private Information Quality on Rating Accuracy 
 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and EJR credit ratings interacted with measures of private 
information quality (PI). The measures are defined in the text and Appendix A. Panel A includes the results for EJR ratings; Panel B for S&P ratings; and Panel 
C for the incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and 
quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Egan-Jones Ratings 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
ejrating 0.3966*** 0.4441*** 0.4376*** 0.4643*** 0.4404*** 0.4658*** 0.4112*** 0.4494*** 
 (19.57) (26.42) (23.68) (29.35) (23.71) (26.96) (23.99) (23.13) 
PI -0.5743*** -0.1537 -0.1998 0.2954 -0.3244* 0.3484* 0.1038 0.4799*** 
 (-2.79) (-0.99) (-0.89) (1.57) (-1.65) (1.80) (0.49) (4.04) 
PI_EJR 0.0784*** 0.0019 0.0020 -0.0232 0.0292 -0.0640*** 0.0706*** -0.0009 
 (3.92) (0.12) (0.09) (-1.31) (1.51) (-3.43) (3.74) (-0.07) 
Constant -13.6989*** -14.0142*** -13.9680*** -14.2256*** -13.9526*** -14.1454*** -13.9156*** -14.2925*** 
 (-67.48) (-78.57) (-72.13) (-81.12) (-72.76) (-73.96) (-86.23) (-79.56) 
         
Observations 25,506 24,625 25,111 29,649 29,649 24,486 22,349 22,349 
R-squared 0.466 0.447 0.448 0.464 0.465 0.450 0.481 0.472 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Ratings 
 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
sprating 0.3173*** 0.4104*** 0.3859*** 0.4338*** 0.3950*** 0.4394*** 0.3511*** 0.3925*** 
 (13.59) (17.81) (14.77) (20.67) (16.64) (17.91) (17.45) (17.17) 
PI -0.9796*** -0.0027 -0.3327 0.4246** -0.4387* 0.6599*** -0.3076 0.2625** 
 (-4.05) (-0.01) (-1.21) (1.97) (-1.76) (2.80) (-1.29) (2.12) 
PI_SP 0.1416*** -0.0197 -0.0052 -0.0364* 0.0442* -0.1126*** 0.1405*** 0.0257* 
 (5.96) (-0.88) (-0.19) (-1.77) (1.74) (-4.78) (6.42) (1.85) 
Constant -12.9585*** -13.5210*** -13.2748*** -13.8120*** -13.4158*** -13.6881*** -13.2991*** -13.6441*** 
 (-57.09) (-61.43) (-52.97) (-64.05) (-58.03) (-56.41) (-73.03) (-68.80) 
         
Observations 25,506 24,625 25,111 29,649 29,649 24,486 22,349 22,349 
R-squared 0.360 0.323 0.327 0.352 0.352 0.331 0.384 0.358 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel C: Incremental effect of S&P ratings over EJR ratings 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
ejrating 0.3797*** 0.4231*** 0.3937*** 0.4458*** 0.4181*** 0.4386*** 0.3928*** 0.4255*** 
 (17.98) (21.72) (17.61) (24.90) (20.50) (21.28) (21.74) (21.52) 
PI -0.5070** -0.0686 -0.5128** 0.2621 -0.3607 0.3044 -0.0713 0.3794*** 
 (-2.20) (-0.38) (-2.10) (1.26) (-1.55) (1.45) (-0.32) (3.15) 
PI_EJR 0.0745*** -0.0055 0.0332 -0.0199 0.0360 -0.0595*** 0.0888*** 0.0091 
 (3.33) (-0.29) (1.41) (-1.01) (1.55) (-2.92) (4.39) (0.72) 
spmejr -0.1233*** -0.1044** -0.1999*** -0.0917*** -0.1068*** -0.1257*** -0.1200*** -0.1391*** 
 (-3.31) (-2.48) (-5.08) (-2.71) (-2.94) (-3.01) (-3.46) (-3.35) 
PI_spmejr 0.0360 -0.0494 0.1194*** -0.0019 0.0241 -0.0217 0.1177*** 0.0613* 
 (0.82) (-1.12) (2.74) (-0.05) (0.55) (-0.47) (2.82) (1.73) 
Constant -13.5697*** -13.8824*** -13.6138*** -14.0664*** -13.7767*** -13.9360*** -13.7556*** -14.0960*** 
 (-65.47) (-71.46) (-61.36) (-74.28) (-67.40) (-65.62) (-81.95) (-78.55) 
         
Observations 25,506 24,625 25,111 29,649 29,649 24,486 22,349 22,349 
R-squared 0.470 0.453 0.456 0.467 0.468 0.456 0.485 0.477 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 16 
Direct Effect of Private Information Quality on Rating Timeliness 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. One of 
the key independent variables is the change in the modified Campbell failure score during the quarter. The change is represented by the indicator variable csup, 
which equals one when the failure score increases during the quarter. PI represents the private information variable. PI_csup is the interaction of these terms. All 
other variables are also defined in Appendix A. Panel A includes the results for EJR downgrades; Panel B for S&P downgrades; and Panel C for the difference, 
downdiff. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: EJR Downgrades 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
csup 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (7.17) (7.40) (8.76) (8.47) (7.54) (8.46) (8.45) (6.55) 
PI -0.017*** 0.001 0.018*** -0.002 -0.009** -0.002 -0.009 0.003 
 (-2.65) (0.26) (3.07) (-0.33) (-2.02) (-0.50) (-1.16) (0.68) 
PI_csup 0.012 -0.007 -0.013* 0.007 0.015** -0.019** 0.067*** 0.020** 
 (1.29) (-0.89) (-1.71) (1.00) (2.15) (-2.16) (4.45) (2.55) 
campscore_lag 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (10.79) (9.75) (9.74) (11.07) (11.07) (9.54) (10.43) (10.17) 
ejrating_lag -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-7.36) (-6.31) (-5.96) (-7.36) (-7.29) (-6.29) (-7.56) (-7.37) 
Constant 0.450*** 0.474*** 0.456*** 0.455*** 0.458*** 0.477*** 0.460*** 0.463*** 
 (13.52) (12.07) (11.71) (13.54) (13.63) (12.04) (12.97) (12.76) 
         
Observations 24,432 23,820 24,269 28,527 28,527 23,683 22,193 22,193 
R-squared 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.062 0.060 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
113 
 
Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
csup 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
 (4.70) (4.77) (5.46) (6.68) (5.86) (4.23) (5.51) (5.43) 
PI 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.010** 0.011* -0.000 
 (0.47) (0.57) (-0.21) (0.74) (-1.37) (-2.28) (1.75) (-0.13) 
PI_csup 0.013** -0.003 -0.013** -0.009* 0.001 -0.012* 0.042*** 0.002 
 (1.99) (-0.56) (-2.53) (-1.88) (0.20) (-1.71) (4.51) (0.51) 
campscore_lag 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (12.36) (11.61) (11.33) (12.74) (12.74) (11.51) (10.84) (11.19) 
sprating_lag -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-8.95) (-7.20) (-7.50) (-8.46) (-8.34) (-7.42) (-7.91) (-7.60) 
Constant 0.353*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 0.341*** 0.343*** 0.331*** 0.339*** 0.357*** 
 (14.45) (13.61) (13.10) (15.44) (15.31) (13.96) (16.31) (16.43) 
         
Observations 25,225 24,417 24,890 29,348 29,348 24,281 22,193 22,193 
R-squared 0.050 0.045 0.046 0.050 0.050 0.045 0.052 0.048 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
csup 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
 (5.12) (6.55) (7.19) (6.55) (5.52) (7.11) (6.70) (5.12) 
PI -0.022*** -0.003 0.019*** -0.005 -0.010* 0.007 -0.019** 0.004 
 (-3.56) (-0.45) (3.26) (-0.84) (-1.95) (1.17) (-2.40) (0.77) 
PI_csup -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.017** 0.014* -0.003 0.025* 0.016* 
 (-0.01) (-0.57) (-0.09) (2.28) (1.83) (-0.30) (1.92) (1.92) 
campscore_lag 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (4.90) (5.60) (5.98) (5.55) (5.50) (5.88) (5.72) (5.26) 
ejrmsp_lag -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (-10.77) (-9.54) (-9.68) (-10.65) (-10.63) (-9.35) (-9.21) (-9.09) 
Constant 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.069*** 
 (6.29) (5.48) (5.44) (6.41) (6.23) (5.69) (5.32) (4.69) 
         
Observations 24,398 23,794 24,240 28,491 28,491 23,657 22,193 22,193 
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Table 17 
The Discipline Effect of Accounting Quality on Rating Accuracy 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and EJR credit ratings, conflicts of interest, and accounting 
quality. The base model is the same as that presented in Table 6, but it includes all interactions between credit ratings, conflicts of interest (CI), and accounting 
quality (AQ) measures. The CI and AQ variables are defined in the text and in Appendix A. The key coefficient is on the triple interaction between ratings, 
conflicts of interest, and accounting quality. For brevity, only the coefficients on these interactions are shown. The table has three sections – one for EJR, one for 
S&P, and one for the incremental S&P rating (S&P rating – EJR rating). t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by 
firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  CI 
RATING AQ financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
EJR TLR 0.4567 0.1853 -0.3321** -0.0097 0.0752 0.2052 
  (0.08) (1.03) (-2.00) (-0.12) (0.25) (0.92) 
 ATLR -12.7121 0.1454 -0.3528** -0.0173 -0.0865 0.2630 
  (-0.64) (0.92) (-2.37) (-0.25) (-0.35) (1.22) 
 DiscAcc -0.5591 -0.0721 -0.0111 0.0191 -0.1525 -0.0019 
  (-1.57) (-0.65) (-0.09) (0.31) (-1.36) (-0.02) 
        
SP TLR -0.6967 0.4509* -0.1260 -0.1348 0.2651 0.4846 
  (-0.14) (1.71) (-0.53) (-1.61) (0.65) (1.37) 
 ATLR -0.2818 0.3054 -0.2970 -0.1421 -0.0012 0.4123 
  (-0.03) (1.26) (-1.32) (-1.63) (-0.00) (1.18) 
 DiscAcc -0.2841 -0.0351 -0.0287 0.0536 -0.1417 -0.0103 
  (-0.99) (-0.22) (-0.14) (0.71) (-0.88) (-0.06) 
        
spmejr TLR -4.1319 1.0724** 0.7435 -0.1023 1.0821* 0.7369 
  (-0.98) (2.27) (1.17) (-0.40) (1.85) (1.36) 
 ATLR 1.1588 0.8293* 0.1942 -0.1640 1.0953** 1.0388** 
  (0.13) (1.90) (0.34) (-0.69) (2.05) (2.01) 
 DiscAcc 0.2933 -0.0985 -0.3120 -0.0963 -0.0068 -0.6959** 
  (0.36) (-0.34) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.03) (-2.19) 
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Table 18 
Information Overlap and the Effect of Accounting Quality on Rating Accuracy 
This table presents the results from linear regressions of the modified Campbell failure score on S&P and EJR credit ratings, private information quality, and 
accounting quality. The base model is the same as that presented in Table 6, but it includes all interactions between credit ratings, private information (PI), and 
accounting quality (AQ) measures. The PI and AQ variables are defined in the text and in Appendix A. The key coefficient is on the triple interaction between 
ratings, private information, and accounting quality. For brevity, only the coefficients on these interactions are shown. The table has three sections – one for EJR, 
one for S&P, and one for the incremental S&P rating (S&P rating – EJR rating). t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  PI 
RATING AQ pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
EJR TLR -0.1946 0.0820 0.0563 0.0980 0.2254 -0.0860 -0.3930* -0.1118 
  (-1.06) (0.42) (0.24) (0.54) (1.20) (-0.38) (-1.96) (-0.85) 
 ATLR -0.0712 0.0819 0.0487 0.2147 0.4425** -0.0238 -0.3615** -0.1590 
  (-0.44) (0.44) (0.25) (1.26) (2.49) (-0.12) (-2.01) (-1.28) 
 DiscAcc 0.1863* -0.1276 -0.1476 -0.0903 -0.0733 0.0037 0.1508 0.1700* 
  (1.75) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-0.87) (-0.62) (0.03) (1.26) (1.80) 
          
SP TLR 0.1207 0.0354 0.0909 0.2412 0.5625** -0.0662 -0.2779 0.1258 
  (0.50) (0.13) (0.27) (0.97) (2.06) (-0.23) (-1.17) (0.83) 
 ATLR 0.2471 0.1253 -0.0903 0.4065* 0.8104*** -0.1051 -0.2041 0.0340 
  (1.20) (0.47) (-0.31) (1.74) (3.19) (-0.42) (-0.97) (0.23) 
 DiscAcc 0.1264 -0.2077 -0.0521 0.0329 -0.0017 0.2029 0.0972 0.0935 
  (0.90) (-1.20) (-0.29) (0.23) (-0.01) (1.10) (0.60) (0.80) 
          
spmejr TLR 0.6227 -0.4776 -0.4977 -0.1807 0.4286 0.2549 0.6592* 0.3722 
  (1.20) (-0.99) (-1.02) (-0.39) (0.91) (0.52) (1.66) (1.03) 
 ATLR 0.6600 -0.3404 -0.6275 0.3281 0.8692** 0.0653 0.7677** 0.3842 
  (1.34) (-0.80) (-1.61) (0.80) (2.09) (0.16) (2.15) (1.11) 
 DiscAcc -0.2854 -0.2224 0.0525 0.5886** 0.2296 0.3027 -0.3874 -0.3164 
  (-0.98) (-0.72) (0.17) (2.18) (0.77) (0.83) (-1.34) (-1.14) 
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Table 19 
The Discipline Effect of Accounting Quality on Rating Timeliness 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. These 
variables are regressed on csup (indicator variable equal to one when the failure score increases during the quarter), accounting quality (AQ), and conflict of 
interest (CI) measures. The CI and AQ variables are defined in the text and in Appendix A. The key coefficient is on the triple interaction between csup, conflicts 
of interest, and accounting quality. For brevity, only the coefficients on these interactions are shown.  The table has three sections - one for EJR downgrades, one 
for S&P downgrades, and one for the difference, downdiff. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and 
quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  CI 
DOWNGRADE AQ bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
EJR TLR 0.086 -1.551* 0.062 0.162 0.001 0.030 0.116 
  (0.71) (-1.80) (0.53) (0.65) (0.01) (0.24) (0.84) 
 ATLR -0.016 -1.040 0.039 0.137 0.054 -0.008 0.140 
  (-0.17) (-1.60) (0.37) (0.61) (0.50) (-0.07) (1.34) 
 DiscAcc -0.036 -0.419 -0.050 0.188* 0.048 -0.253*** -0.036 
  (-0.39) (-1.26) (-0.63) (1.78) (0.66) (-3.13) (-0.47) 
         
S&P TLR -0.116 -0.939* -0.064 -0.097 0.053 -0.015 0.126* 
  (-1.33) (-1.77) (-0.79) (-0.82) (0.71) (-0.19) (1.70) 
 ATLR -0.099 -0.586*** -0.062 -0.048 0.041 -0.033 0.102* 
  (-1.29) (-4.76) (-0.88) (-0.44) (0.53) (-0.52) (1.72) 
 DiscAcc -0.075 -0.042 0.039 0.021 0.067 -0.124** -0.006 
  (-1.51) (-0.22) (0.62) (0.25) (1.30) (-2.31) (-0.12) 
         
DOWNDIFF TLR 0.207* -0.590 0.114 0.196 -0.061 0.037 -0.006 
  (1.95) (-1.18) (1.09) (0.81) (-0.50) (0.28) (-0.05) 
 ATLR 0.085 -0.518 0.079 0.094 0.005 0.015 0.034 
  (0.98) (-0.86) (0.75) (0.46) (0.04) (0.13) (0.31) 
 DiscAcc 0.033 -0.318* -0.082 0.176 -0.022 -0.132 -0.027 
  (0.38) (-1.77) (-1.00) (1.19) (-0.27) (-1.37) (-0.34) 
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Table 20 
Information Overlap and the Effect of Accounting Quality on Rating Timeliness 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. These 
variables are regressed on csup (indicator variable equal to one when the failure score increases during the quarter), accounting quality (AQ), and private 
information (PI) measures. The PI and AQ variables are defined in the text and in Appendix A. The key coefficient is on the triple interaction between csup, 
private information, and accounting quality. For brevity, only the coefficients on these interactions are shown.  The table has three sections - one for EJR 
downgrades, one for S&P downgrades, and one for the difference, downdiff. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  PI 
DOWNGRADE  pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
EJR TLR -0.005 0.083 0.048 -0.015 0.048 -0.257* 0.351* 0.154 
  (-0.04) (0.76) (0.40) (-0.18) (0.49) (-1.96) (1.86) (1.55) 
 ATLR -0.055 0.055 0.037 -0.010 0.067 -0.150 0.029 0.147* 
  (-0.53) (0.61) (0.37) (-0.14) (0.84) (-1.32) (0.16) (1.67) 
 DISCACC -0.012 -0.027 -0.073 0.040 -0.048 -0.038 0.073 -0.023 
  (-0.21) (-0.38) (-1.01) (0.68) (-0.82) (-0.46) (0.70) (-0.32) 
          
SP TLR 0.079 -0.011 0.002 -0.010 0.035 -0.100 0.382** -0.048 
  (0.78) (-0.11) (0.03) (-0.09) (0.39) (-1.22) (2.44) (-0.67) 
 ATLR 0.018 -0.009 0.000 -0.021 0.063 -0.094 0.328** -0.084 
  (0.21) (-0.11) (0.01) (-0.23) (0.77) (-1.28) (2.20) (-1.48) 
 DiscAcc 0.007 0.048 0.049 0.082 0.095* 0.054 -0.277** 0.000 
  (0.13) (0.76) (0.78) (1.38) (1.71) (0.73) (-2.54) (0.01) 
          
DOWNDIFF TLR -0.083 0.091 0.061 0.007 0.012 -0.186 -0.009 0.200* 
  (-0.66) (0.64) (0.51) (0.07) (0.10) (-1.56) (-0.06) (1.77) 
 ATLR -0.068 0.064 0.051 0.019 -0.000 -0.065 -0.276 0.229** 
  (-0.59) (0.56) (0.52) (0.19) (-0.00) (-0.56) (-1.54) (2.38) 
 DiscAcc -0.013 -0.083 -0.121 -0.041 -0.138** -0.100 0.351*** -0.019 
  (-0.19) (-0.93) (-1.42) (-0.55) (-2.03) (-1.03) (2.71) (-0.23) 
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Table 21 
Accounting Quality and the Time Between Downgrade and Default 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions using the sample of all rating changes within 360 days 
prior to a default. The dependent variable, dahead, is a measure of rating timeliness and is defined in 
Appendix A. AQ represents the accounting quality measure included as an independent variable. EJRdum 
is an indicator variable equal to one for changes in Egan-Jones ratings and zero for S&P rating changes. All 
control variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated 
using standard errors clustered by year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent var = dahead 
VARIABLES TLR ATLR DiscAcc 
        
EJRdum -18.097 -14.056 12.464* 
 (-1.15) (-1.05) (2.08) 
AQ 231.943* 143.823* 20.109 
 (1.89) (1.92) (0.86) 
EJRdum_AQ 202.974* 175.615* -40.244 
 (1.83) (1.86) (-0.81) 
begyrrate 6.457** 6.931** 7.446*** 
 (2.75) (2.66) (5.33) 
log_size_adj -9.277 -8.436 -7.073 
 (-1.26) (-1.14) (-1.11) 
cfotl -96.403 -61.407 -95.293 
 (-1.06) (-0.80) (-0.82) 
tlta 139.316*** 137.008*** 118.167** 
 (4.33) (4.08) (2.50) 
Constant -61.638 -55.877 52.123 
 (-0.60) (-0.54) (0.61) 
    
Observations 350 350 327 
R-squared 0.185 0.175 0.158 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Year Year Year 
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Table 22 
Accounting Quality and the Average Credit Rating Prior to Default 
 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions using the sample of all firms that default. Each 
defaulting firm has two observations – one for its S&P rating and one for its EJR rating. The dependent 
variable, wrate, is a measure of rating timeliness and is defined in Appendix A. AQ represents the 
accounting quality measure included as an independent variable. EJRdum is an indicator variable equal to 
one for the weighted average Egan-Jones ratings and zero for the S&P ratings. All control variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent var = wrate 
VARIABLES TLR ATLR DiscAcc 
        
EJRdum 1.403*** 1.571*** 1.891*** 
 (5.02) (7.30) (12.08) 
log_size_adj -0.912*** -0.906*** -0.979*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.17) (-4.38) 
cfotl -11.533* -11.316* -12.703** 
 (-1.94) (-1.88) (-3.01) 
tlta 2.558 2.584 1.782 
 (1.41) (1.45) (0.86) 
AQ 3.296 1.942 -1.645 
 (1.32) (1.18) (-0.93) 
EJRdum_AQ 3.892** 2.899** -0.846 
 (2.60) (2.16) (-0.50) 
Constant 20.057*** 20.303*** 22.331*** 
 (12.12) (13.24) (10.12) 
    
Observations 166 166 154 
R-squared 0.407 0.401 0.439 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Year Year Year 
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Table 23 
Rating Responses to Accounting Restatements 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown, 
spdown, and downdiff, all defined in Appendix A. These variables are regressed on res_adv and res_fav, 
indicator variables equal to one when the rated firm announces an adverse or favorable accounting 
restatement, respectively. Control variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES ejrdown spdown downdiff ejrdown spdown downdiff 
              
res_adv 0.092*** 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.029* 0.032* 
 (4.32) (2.77) (2.81) (3.39) (1.72) (1.67) 
res_fav -0.019 0.014 -0.022 -0.031 0.003 -0.036 
 (-0.77) (0.66) (-0.74) (-1.27) (0.15) (-1.36) 
campscore_chg    0.058*** 0.025*** 0.033*** 
    (11.01) (8.74) (8.13) 
campscore_lag    0.031*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 
    (11.77) (13.06) (6.30) 
ejrating_lag 0.003***   -0.010***   
 (4.62)   (-7.61)   
sprating_lag  0.002***   -0.007***  
  (5.27)   (-8.71)  
ejrmsp_lag   -0.020***   -0.024*** 
   (-10.37)   (-10.64) 
Constant 0.100*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.514*** 0.366*** 0.112*** 
 (15.49) (9.61) (26.11) (13.85) (15.60) (8.25) 
       
Observations 36,185 37,384 36,127 28,526 29,347 28,490 
R-squared 0.025 0.011 0.024 0.077 0.058 0.033 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 24 
Conflicts of Interest and the Discipline Effect of Restatements 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown (Panel A), spdown (Panel B), and downdiff (Panel C), all 
defined in Appendix A. These variables are regressed on res_adv and res_fav, indicator variables equal to one when the rated firm announces an adverse or 
favorable accounting restatement, respectively. The model also includes measures of conflicts of interest (CI) interacted with res_adv. Control variables are 
defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: EJR Downgrades 
 
 CI 
VARIABLES bbb propstd presox financial ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
res_adv 0.052*** 0.019 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.096*** 0.065** 0.039* 
 (2.71) (1.06) (3.08) (3.42) (3.12) (2.24) (1.87) 
res_fav -0.031 -0.032 -0.029 -0.031 -0.031 -0.034 -0.030 
 (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.14) (-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.28) (-1.24) 
resadv_CI 0.039 0.102** 0.110 -0.102** -0.053 0.007 0.058 
 (0.87) (2.37) (1.56) (-2.39) (-1.53) (0.16) (1.30) 
CI -0.009* 0.000 0.022 0.013 -0.020* -0.036*** -0.015** 
 (-1.91) (0.01) (1.55) (0.74) (-1.86) (-4.98) (-2.47) 
campscore_chg 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 (11.03) (11.00) (10.41) (11.01) (10.89) (10.70) (11.01) 
campscore_lag 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (11.79) (11.87) (9.35) (11.76) (12.12) (11.73) (11.69) 
ejrating_lag -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-8.08) (-7.56) (-6.93) (-7.61) (-7.81) (-7.95) (-7.63) 
Constant 0.520*** 0.517*** 0.530*** 0.514*** 0.529*** 0.568*** 0.546*** 
 (14.36) (13.96) (9.86) (13.85) (13.14) (13.45) (13.24) 
        
Observations 28,490 28,216 28,526 28,526 28,526 26,098 28,248 
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.068 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.078 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
 
 CI 
VARIABLES bbb propstd presox financial ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
res_adv 0.031 0.009 0.030* 0.030* 0.015 0.024 0.008 
 (1.37) (0.55) (1.65) (1.75) (0.63) (1.19) (0.42) 
res_fav 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.26) (0.15) (0.14) (-0.06) (0.21) 
resadv_CI -0.006 0.043** 0.017 -0.062*** 0.024 0.010 0.044 
 (-0.18) (2.02) (0.30) (-2.90) (0.66) (0.38) (1.44) 
CI -0.008*** -0.002 0.000 0.013 0.005 -0.024*** -0.032*** 
 (-2.65) (-0.80) (0.02) (0.91) (1.43) (-5.67) (-8.15) 
campscore_chg 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (8.75) (8.63) (9.34) (8.74) (8.92) (7.64) (9.03) 
campscore_lag 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (13.06) (13.15) (13.33) (13.07) (13.12) (12.49) (13.79) 
sprating_lag -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (-8.84) (-8.62) (-8.77) (-8.68) (-8.73) (-8.66) (-10.45) 
Constant 0.371*** 0.369*** 0.355*** 0.366*** 0.362*** 0.403*** 0.427*** 
 (15.56) (15.69) (14.25) (15.58) (15.12) (14.65) (16.12) 
        
Observations 29,347 29,024 29,347 29,347 29,347 26,876 29,058 
R-squared 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.061 0.062 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
 
 CI 
VARIABLES bbb propstd presox financial ewr6 indlevmed ltd 
                
res_adv 0.017 0.010 0.020 0.032* 0.079*** 0.037 0.033 
 (0.80) (0.49) (1.01) (1.67) (3.23) (1.28) (1.40) 
res_fav -0.036 -0.034 -0.038 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 
 (-1.36) (-1.26) (-1.44) (-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.42) (-1.31) 
resadv_CI 0.050 0.056 0.108* -0.040 -0.078** -0.002 0.007 
 (1.09) (1.44) (1.85) (-1.07) (-2.27) (-0.05) (0.15) 
CI 0.001 0.012** 0.027** -0.004 -0.024*** -0.008 0.024*** 
 (0.15) (2.50) (2.30) (-0.20) (-2.90) (-1.54) (4.99) 
campscore_chg 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (8.15) (8.10) (6.15) (8.14) (7.58) (7.48) (7.88) 
campscore_lag 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (6.33) (6.39) (5.63) (6.33) (6.04) (6.51) (5.76) 
ejrmsp_lag -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (-10.61) (-10.77) (-11.00) (-10.62) (-10.42) (-10.65) (-11.04) 
Constant 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.134*** 0.122*** 0.097*** 
 (8.29) (7.99) (6.79) (8.27) (8.64) (7.71) (7.01) 
        
Observations 28,490 28,182 28,490 28,490 28,490 26,066 28,213 
R-squared 0.033 0.034 0.026 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Table 25 
Restatements and Private Information Overlap 
 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown (Panel A), spdown (Panel B), and downdiff (Panel C), all 
defined in Appendix A. These variables are regressed on res_adv and res_fav, indicator variables equal to one when the rated firm announces an adverse or 
favorable accounting restatement, respectively. The model also includes measures of private information (PI) interacted with res_adv. PI variables are defined in 
the text and Appendix A. Control variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by 
firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: EJR Downgrades 
 
 PI 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
res_adv 0.075*** 0.063** 0.091*** 0.035 0.055* 0.120*** 0.077*** 0.031 
 (2.80) (2.07) (2.71) (1.47) (1.69) (3.49) (3.52) (1.17) 
res_fav -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.031 -0.031 -0.026 -0.023 -0.021 
 (-0.77) (-0.54) (-0.52) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-0.67) 
resadv_PI -0.005 0.021 -0.028 0.074* 0.015 -0.075* -0.041 0.068* 
 (-0.14) (0.56) (-0.61) (1.85) (0.38) (-1.84) (-0.95) (1.90) 
PI -0.012** -0.002 0.012** -0.003 -0.006 -0.010** 0.023*** 0.007 
 (-2.06) (-0.40) (2.48) (-0.74) (-1.48) (-2.06) (2.64) (1.50) 
campscore_chg 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (11.61) (10.31) (10.28) (10.99) (11.03) (10.34) (10.49) (10.43) 
campscore_lag 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (11.46) (10.46) (10.38) (11.75) (11.74) (10.17) (11.01) (10.84) 
ejrating_lag -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-7.52) (-6.56) (-6.24) (-7.60) (-7.49) (-6.59) (-7.92) (-7.77) 
Constant 0.509*** 0.534*** 0.518*** 0.515*** 0.516*** 0.540*** 0.515*** 0.523*** 
 (13.67) (12.32) (12.06) (13.84) (13.83) (12.35) (13.53) (13.04) 
         
Observations 24,431 23,819 24,268 28,526 28,526 23,682 22,192 22,192 
R-squared 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
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Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
 
 PI 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
res_adv 0.044* 0.020 0.027 0.004 0.001 0.064** 0.028 0.020 
 (1.67) (0.84) (1.40) (0.23) (0.07) (2.32) (1.27) (0.90) 
res_fav -0.005 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
 (-0.25) (0.27) (0.30) (0.16) (0.16) (0.42) (-0.53) (-0.49) 
resadv_PI -0.017 0.020 0.015 0.065** 0.049 -0.065** -0.041 -0.003 
 (-0.55) (0.85) (0.47) (2.04) (1.56) (-2.05) (-1.23) (-0.11) 
PI 0.008* 0.000 -0.007** -0.004 -0.006** -0.014*** 0.030*** -0.001 
 (1.94) (0.06) (-1.96) (-1.59) (-2.05) (-4.06) (5.52) (-0.43) 
campscore_chg 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (8.87) (7.42) (7.03) (8.79) (8.81) (6.87) (8.36) (8.25) 
campscore_lag 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (12.73) (11.95) (11.60) (13.06) (13.06) (11.80) (11.06) (11.43) 
sprating_lag -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-9.10) (-7.56) (-7.84) (-8.73) (-8.55) (-7.71) (-8.13) (-7.78) 
Constant 0.374*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.367*** 0.367*** 0.352*** 0.359*** 0.381*** 
 (14.62) (14.09) (13.61) (15.68) (15.63) (14.14) (16.44) (16.47) 
         
Observations 25,224 24,416 24,889 29,347 29,347 24,280 22,192 22,192 
R-squared 0.059 0.052 0.053 0.059 0.059 0.051 0.058 0.055 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
 
 PI 
VARIABLES pin tenure varpay score_oc4 score_oc5 option_oc purch180 alpha180 
                  
res_adv 0.026 0.037 0.060** 0.028 0.049* 0.050 0.046* 0.006 
 (0.95) (0.94) (2.26) (1.05) (1.73) (1.57) (1.89) (0.19) 
res_fav -0.016 -0.027 -0.026 -0.036 -0.036 -0.040 -0.015 -0.015 
 (-0.58) (-0.82) (-0.76) (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.24) (-0.54) (-0.53) 
resadv_PI 0.018 0.005 -0.039 0.010 -0.031 -0.004 -0.001 0.072* 
 (0.46) (0.13) (-0.86) (0.24) (-0.83) (-0.09) (-0.01) (1.91) 
PI -0.023*** -0.005 0.020*** 0.001 -0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.008** 
 (-4.40) (-1.01) (4.37) (0.26) (-1.39) (1.23) (-0.86) (2.03) 
campscore_chg 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (8.99) (8.64) (8.58) (8.17) (8.18) (8.53) (7.64) (7.56) 
campscore_lag 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (5.80) (6.39) (6.75) (6.30) (6.28) (6.58) (6.34) (5.99) 
ejrmsp_lag -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (-10.85) (-9.51) (-9.64) (-10.64) (-10.64) (-9.35) (-9.18) (-9.11) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.132*** 0.106*** 0.094*** 
 (8.05) (7.10) (7.05) (8.24) (7.95) (7.31) (6.77) (6.23) 
         
Observations 24,397 23,793 24,239 28,490 28,490 23,656 22,192 22,192 
R-squared 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.034 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter 
Firm & 
Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter Firm & Quarter 
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Table 26 
Conflicts of Interest, Private Information, and the Rating Response to Restatements 
This table presents the results from linear probability models for three dependent variables: ejrdown (Panel A), spdown (Panel B), and downdiff (Panel C), all 
defined in Appendix A. These variables are regressed on res_adv and res_fav, indicator variables equal to one when the rated firm announces an adverse or 
favorable accounting restatement, respectively. It is the same model as that shown in Table 23, augmented with measures of private information (PI) and 
conflicts of interest (CI) as independent variables, both interacted with res_adv. For my hypothesis, the key coefficient is the triple interaction of the CI measure, 
PI measure, and res_adv. For brevity, only this coefficient is shown in the table. PI and CI variables are defined in the text and Appendix A. Control variables are 
defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: EJR downgrades 
 
 CI 
PI ltd bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed 
                
pin 0.130 0.080 0.175*** 0.042 0.082 -0.041 -0.070 
 (1.57) (1.21) (3.81) (0.45) (0.61) (-0.57) (-0.82) 
varpay -0.042 0.026 -0.012 -0.098 -0.088 0.087 -0.024 
 (-0.53) (0.25) (-0.20) (-1.07) (-0.56) (0.96) (-0.26) 
tenure 0.102 0.065 -0.171*** -0.011 -0.144 0.189** 0.093 
 (1.43) (0.83) (-3.09) (-0.15) (-1.51) (2.48) (1.01) 
score_oc4 0.014 0.003 -0.113* -0.012 0.030 0.124 0.250*** 
 (0.18) (0.03) (-1.68) (-0.15) (0.25) (1.35) (2.92) 
score_oc5 0.007 0.094 -0.049 -0.024 -0.111 0.163* 0.130 
 (0.09) (0.98) (-0.68) (-0.36) (-0.74) (1.89) (1.48) 
option_oc 0.163** 0.046 0.001 -0.027 -0.080 0.107 -0.166** 
 (2.00) (0.58) (0.02) (-0.36) (-0.52) (1.31) (-1.99) 
purch180 -0.054 0.110 0.201*** -0.152* 0.249* -0.116 0.112 
 (-0.51) (1.13) (3.61) (-1.78) (1.85) (-1.23) (1.03) 
alpha180 -0.056 -0.016 -0.219*** 0.159* -0.090 0.111 0.018 
 (-0.72) (-0.20) (-4.30) (1.84) (-0.56) (1.55) (0.22) 
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Panel B: S&P Downgrades 
 
 CI 
PI ltd bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed 
                
pin 0.050 0.053 0.043 0.021 0.086 0.053 0.055 
 (0.69) (0.77) (1.18) (0.38) (0.67) (0.78) (0.82) 
varpay -0.071 0.012 -0.011 -0.045 0.150 0.138*** -0.022 
 (-1.30) (0.26) (-0.26) (-0.73) (0.98) (2.61) (-0.33) 
tenure 0.026 0.097* -0.064** 0.035 0.037 0.042 0.134** 
 (0.42) (1.86) (-2.01) (0.61) (0.39) (0.76) (2.00) 
score_oc4 0.082 0.048 -0.080** 0.002 0.145 0.086 0.024 
 (1.46) (0.91) (-2.44) (0.03) (1.00) (1.30) (0.34) 
score_oc5 0.036 0.018 -0.050 0.018 0.181* 0.085 0.039 
 (0.76) (0.33) (-1.28) (0.37) (1.74) (1.36) (0.75) 
option_oc -0.039 0.031 0.054 -0.031 0.304* 0.057 0.017 
 (-0.56) (0.51) (1.22) (-0.70) (1.86) (0.89) (0.25) 
purch180 0.051 0.062 0.052 0.054 0.045 -0.061 -0.064 
 (0.81) (0.68) (1.04) (0.72) (0.64) (-0.92) (-0.97) 
alpha180 -0.016 0.048 -0.047 -0.004 0.109* -0.029 -0.135*** 
 (-0.29) (0.99) (-1.45) (-0.06) (1.82) (-0.56) (-2.79) 
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Panel C: Difference between EJR and S&P downgrades (downdiff) 
 
 CI 
PI ltd bbb financial propstd presox ewr6 indlevmed 
                
pin 0.084 0.005 0.107* 0.019 0.030 -0.086 -0.107 
 (1.06) (0.06) (1.91) (0.21) (0.22) (-1.06) (-1.05) 
varpay 0.004 0.015 0.027 -0.065 -0.182 -0.050 0.012 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.41) (-0.70) (-1.64) (-0.59) (0.12) 
tenure 0.076 -0.041 -0.087 -0.050 -0.160 0.161* -0.037 
 (0.79) (-0.53) (-1.56) (-0.66) (-1.30) (1.89) (-0.34) 
score_oc4 -0.081 -0.046 -0.034 -0.017 -0.092 0.037 0.228** 
 (-0.96) (-0.56) (-0.62) (-0.19) (-0.67) (0.39) (2.42) 
score_oc5 -0.042 0.072 -0.000 -0.044 -0.277* 0.079 0.092 
 (-0.63) (0.95) (-0.01) (-0.70) (-1.79) (0.92) (1.09) 
option_oc 0.192** 0.004 -0.032 -0.006 -0.334*** 0.070 -0.170* 
 (2.10) (0.05) (-0.61) (-0.07) (-4.24) (0.82) (-1.75) 
purch180 -0.108 0.043 0.105* -0.209** 0.194 -0.057 0.172* 
 (-1.27) (0.44) (1.86) (-2.19) (1.32) (-0.49) (1.95) 
alpha180 -0.040 -0.061 -0.139*** 0.168* -0.207 0.136 0.154* 
 (-0.50) (-0.89) (-3.07) (1.75) (-1.54) (1.64) (1.81) 
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Figure 1 
Accuracy Ratios for Default Prediction 
 
Panel A: All rated firms 
 
 
This figure graphs the accuracy ratios for the modified Campbell failure score, Egan-Jones ratings, and 
S&P ratings over default prediction horizons up to 12 quarters for the full sample of firms rated by both 
agencies. The data for this figure is found in Table 3. 
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Panel B: Speculative grade firms 
 
 
This figure graphs the accuracy ratios for the modified Campbell failure score, Egan-Jones ratings, and 
S&P ratings over default prediction horizons up to 12 quarters for the sample of firms rated below 
investment grade by both agencies. The data for this figure is found in Table 3. 
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Figure 2 
S&P and Egan-Jones Ratings Across Default Risk Groups 
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